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ABSTRACT  
   
Motivated by the need for cities to prepare and be resilient to unpredictable future 
weather conditions, this dissertation advances a novel infrastructure development theory 
of “safe-to-fail” to increase the adaptive capacity of cities to climate change. Current 
infrastructure development is primarily reliant on identifying probable risks to engineered 
systems and making infrastructure reliable to maintain its function up to a designed 
system capacity. However, alterations happening in the earth system (e.g., atmosphere, 
oceans, land, and ice) and in human systems (e.g., greenhouse gas emission, population, 
land-use, technology, and natural resource use) are increasing the uncertainties in weather 
predictions and risk calculations and making it difficult for engineered infrastructure to 
maintain intended design thresholds in non-stationary future. This dissertation presents a 
new way to develop safe-to-fail infrastructure that departs from the current practice of 
risk calculation and is able to manage failure consequences when unpredicted risks 
overwhelm engineered systems. 
 This dissertation 1) defines infrastructure failure, refines existing safe-to-fail 
theory, and compares decision considerations for safe-to-fail vs. fail-safe infrastructure 
development under non-stationary climate; 2) suggests an approach to integrate the 
estimation of infrastructure failure impacts with extreme weather risks; 3) provides a 
decision tool to implement resilience strategies into safe-to-fail infrastructure 
development; and, 4) recognizes diverse perspectives for adopting safe-to-fail theory into 
practice in various decision contexts. 
 Overall, this dissertation advances safe-to-fail theory to help guide climate 
  ii 
adaptation decisions that consider infrastructure failure and their consequences. The 
results of this dissertation demonstrate an emerging need for stakeholders, including 
policy makers, planners, engineers, and community members, to understand an 
impending “infrastructure trolley problem”, where the adaptive capacity of some regions 
is improved at the expense of others. Safe-to-fail further engages stakeholders to bring 
their knowledge into the prioritization of various failure costs based on their institutional, 
regional, financial, and social capacity to withstand failures. This approach connects to 
sustainability, where city practitioners deliberately think of and include the future cost of 
social, environmental and economic attributes in planning and decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem statement 
 During the last few decades, many regions around the world have experienced 
growing climate-related challenges i.e., sea-level rise, extreme weather, ecosystem 
disturbance, and etc. Cities where infrastructure serve large populations are facing new 
risks that are coming from non-stationarity of weather (A Revi et al., 2014). Urban 
infrastructure built during the last few decades are planned to provide persistent service 
to people, thus designed to be robust to any form of shock to the system as predicted 
based on historical data. However, the uncertain nature of weather events is expanding 
due to climate change and infrastructure systems are experiencing disruptions despite 
they are built according to the engineering criteria that require a scrupulous calculation of 
probable risks (Olsen, 2015). There have been several catastrophic infrastructure failures 
due to extreme weather events such as the levee and flood wall failures during Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans in 2005 (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2006), communication and power network failures during 
Hurricane Sandy in New York City in 2012 (Solecki & Rosenzweig, 2014), and drainage 
system failures during Hurricane Harvey in Houston in 2017 (Sebastian, Antonia 
Lendering et al., 2017). While weather phenomena themselves were more or less 
expected considering the geographic characteristics and meteorological history of the 
areas, what was not expected was the actual intensity and impact of hurricanes 
experienced due to the failure of infrastructure systems that were designed to withstand 
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these events. Failures of these infrastructure led to unforeseen consequences including 
human loss, property damage, public service loss, critical infrastructure disruption that 
are interdependent with others, business and livelihood interruption, health hazard, 
environmental loss, adverse influences on regional economy, and many more that were 
not anticipated. 
 Current infrastructure development is primarily reliant on identifying probable 
risks to engineered systems and making infrastructure reliable to maintain its function up 
to a designed system capacity, i.e., fail-safe (Figure 1.1). Recent advancements in climate 
models favor future climate scenarios projection to evaluate the intensity and frequency 
of extreme weather events and to provide the ranges of climatic risks that may be 
experienced by infrastructure. However, changes happening in the earth system (e.g., 
atmosphere, oceans, land, and ice) and in human systems (e.g., greenhouse gas emission, 
population, land-use, technology, and natural resource use) are increasing the 
uncertainties in weather predictions and making it difficult for engineered infrastructure 
to uphold the risk threshold against unforeseen weather events in non-stationary future 
climate (Gurgel, Henry Chen, Paltsev, & Reilly, 2016; U.S. Global Change Research 
Program, 2018). Future infrastructure development needs a new approach that departs 
from the current practice of risk calculation and is able to manage failure consequences 
when unpredicted risks overwhelm engineered systems. From the lessons of recent 
hurricanes, one way to prepare for unpredictable climate is to anticipate possible 
consequences by overwhelmed risks and infrastructure failures. Whereas lots of effort 
have been made in estimating the optimal risk threshold in order to design robust 
infrastructure, there has been less attention on what might happen to the robust 
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infrastructure or the region that the system serves when risks exceed the risk threshold of 
engineered infrastructure (Dunford, Harrison, & Rounsevell, 2015; Guikema, 2009; 
IPCC, 2013; Olsen, 2015; Tye, Holland, & Done, 2015). In a non-stationary future, new 
infrastructure development practice are vital to protect the infrastructure and its 
surrounding environment and vulnerable populations against extreme climatic risks and 
infrastructure failure. 
 
Figure 1.1. Current development process of fail-safe infrastructure focusing on the 
probabilistic risk calculation 
 “Safe-to-fail” has emerged as a new infrastructure theory that anticipates the 
failure of infrastructure, thus strategically designing the system to minimize and contain 
the failure (Steiner, 2006). As experienced with recent extreme weather events, when 
robust (fail-safe) infrastructure fail, the impacts of those failure can be catastrophic and 
make already vulnerable populations more vulnerable. There is growing concern that 
current infrastructure that are designed to be “fail-safe”, i.e., infrastructure that are 
designed to resist functional and structural failure, would not endure the climate non-
stationarity. However, the few studies that have explored the safe-to-fail concept do not 
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critically examine the approach or contrast it with traditional infrastructure designs. The 
few studies that have addressed the crucial need of infrastructure design paradigm change 
to safe-to-fail affirmed that selected resilience strategies can facilitate the system to allow 
failure and minimize the impacts (Ahern, 2011; J. Park, Seager, Rao, Convertino, & 
Linkov, 2013). Despite, no studies have examined how safe-to-fail infrastructure 
contribute to increasing a region’s adaptive capacity to climate change, why and how 
different decision considerations are needed for developing infrastructure to be safe-to-
fail vs. fail-safe, and what decision tools are available to implement resilience strategies 
into safe-to-fail infrastructure development practices. Cities around the world move faster 
towards needing climate adaptation solutions and infrastructure’s significant role in 
tackling climate change is emphasized (Wise et al., 2014). To respond to a need for a new 
practice in developing and  restructuring built infrastructure that were largely 
implemented in the twentieth century (Chester et al., 2014; Creutzig et al., 2016; Eakin et 
al., 2007; Miller, Chester, & Munoz-Erickson, 2018; Redman & Miller, 2015), a more 
critical framing of safe-to-fail is vital. 
1.2. Research objectives 
 With the aim of more critical framing of safe-to-fail theory, this dissertation 
addresses the following objectives: 
1. To define infrastructure failure, formalize the safe-to-fail theory, and compare 
decision considerations for safe-to-fail vs. fail-safe infrastructure development 
under non-stationary climate; 
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2. To develop a method to include the potential impact of infrastructure failure in 
risk evaluation for safe-to-fail infrastructure development; 
3. To provide a decision tool to incorporate resilience strategies into safe-to-fail 
infrastructure development; 
4. To recognize diverse perspectives when adopting resilience strategies and safe-to-
fail theory into the practice of infrastructure development in various decision 
contexts. 
1.3. Chapter summary 
Chapter 2: New definition of safe-to-fail 
Research 
Questions 
What is safe-to-fail? How might safe-to-fail be useful in promoting 
climate change adaptation and resilient infrastructure? What are 
decision considerations for safe-to-fail infrastructure in comparison 
to fail-safe? 
Approach Review theoretical perspectives on previous safe-to-fail studies and 
current infrastructure development practice 
Deliverable Submitted article in Earth’s Future (June 2018) 
Intellectual 
Merit 
Identify new standpoint of decision considerations in developing 
resilient infrastructure under non-stationary climate: infrastructure 
trolley problem. Suggest a way to consider and plan for different 
failure consequences in the safe-to-fail development process. Address 
the need of stakeholder engagement in developing infrastructure 
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Chapter 3: Infrastructure vulnerability assessment for urban flooding in Phoenix 
Research 
Questions 
How do we assess the impact of infrastructure failure by extreme 
weather events in a region and incorporate it in the risk evaluation for 
safe-to-fail infrastructure development? How do drainage system 
failures disrupt the level of service provided by roadways in 
Phoenix? 
Approach Use a hydrological model to simulate nodal flooding in Phoenix. 
Evaluate the vulnerability of infrastructure to flooding by assessing 
the service disruption of roadways caused by storm drainage 
overflow during a 100-year storm event 
Deliverable Published article in Climatic Change (October 2017) in combination 
with Chapter 4 
Intellectual 
Merit 
Demonstrate an approach to evaluate infrastructure vulnerability by 
considering the level of service and experienced risks 
 
Chapter 4: Decision-making with resilience strategies for safe-to-fail infrastructure 
Research 
Questions 
How do different perspectives of safe-to-fail guide decision-making 
for infrastructure systems? How do resilience strategies apply in safe-
to-fail infrastructure development? 
Approach Establish decision criteria for safe-to-fail and fail-safe infrastructure 
and demonstrate various researchers’ perspectives on safe-to-fail via 
literature review. Develop an integrated infrastructure adaptation 
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decision framework using multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) 
and combining the infrastructure vulnerability analysis from Chapter 
3 and the decision making perspectives on safe-to-fail infrastructure. 
Deliverable Published article in Climatic Change (October 2017) in combination 
with Chapter 3 
Intellectual 
Merit 
Position multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) as an effective way 
to organize resilience strategies and facilitate decision making across 
different perspectives on safe-to-fail for climate change adaptation 
solutions 
 
Chapter 5: Expert elicitation on resilient and safe-to-fail infrastructure 
Research 
Questions 
How do stakeholders interpret the concepts of resilience and safe-to-
fail? What are the shared and/or discrete perspectives exist when 
considering resilience strategies in various decision contexts? 
Approach Use Q-methodology to explore practitioners’ perspectives on 
adopting resilience strategies for resilient and safe-to-fail 
infrastructure  
Deliverable Peer-reviewed article intended for Frontiers in Built Environment by 
November 2018 
Intellectual 
Merit 
Confirm the need for stakeholder engagement in infrastructure 
development by observing a variety of perspectives on resilience and 
safe-to-fail produced in different decision contexts 
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CHAPTER 2  
NEW DEFINITION OF SAFE-TO-FAIL 
 
This chapter is in review in the journal Earth’s Future and appears as submitted prior to 
review. The citation for this article is: Kim, Y., Chester, M.V., Eisenberg, D.A., Redman, 
C.L. (2018) The Infrastructure Trolley Problem: Positioning Safe-to-fail Infrastructure 
for Climate Change Adaptation. Earth’s Future, in review. 
2.1. Introduction 
The evolving role of infrastructure coupled with changing environmental 
conditions raises the question: is it possible to create an infrastructure system that will not 
catastrophically fail? Given the increasing frequency of extreme events (Guerreiro, 
Dawson, Kilsby, Lewis, & Ford, 2018) and the challenges for infrastructure to withstand 
these events, there is a growing need to consider infrastructure failures explicitly in the 
development process. Thinking about infrastructure failures in development may at first 
sound inappropriate since development practices focus on balancing system cost and 
performance through technical models to achieve an optimum functional capacity rather 
than disaster management. However, non-stationary climate risks challenge the 
robustness afforded by traditional infrastructure development practices, and thus, 
catastrophic infrastructure failures may be inevitable (Boin & McConnell, 2007). If 
infrastructure systems are bound to fail, then decision-makers face an “infrastructure 
trolley problem”, i.e., they must make decisions about who incurs the consequences 
experienced when infrastructure is eventually compromised. The trolley problem is a 
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popular philosophical experiment in ethics: should you pull a lever to divert a runaway 
trolley from its current path where it will hit multiple people, to another path where it will 
hit one? This choice juxtaposes various moral viewpoints (Thomson, 1985). The 
infrastructure trolley problem means that the trade-offs of damages experienced from 
future disasters must be managed prior to construction. This perspective is a stark change 
from previous approaches to planning and development, but is rooted in the emerging 
issues that infrastructure systems face. Building upon historical perspectives of the role 
infrastructure performs in urban development, this work presents an overview of climate 
and infrastructure challenges, suggests a new perspective for defining infrastructure 
failures, demonstrates dilemmas in the development process, and provides initial 
guidance for developing infrastructure systems that are safe-to-fail. 
2.1.1. Evolution of infrastructure development 
Infrastructure development during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries focused 
on utilizing existing natural resources to bolster anthropocentric activities like resource 
provision and economic development. A series of civil works projects, such as the New 
Deal in early 1930s, not only rejuvenated the U.S. economy, but also built hallmark 
infrastructure like the Lincoln Tunnel and Hoover Dam, many of which are still in 
operation today. More recently, the role of infrastructure to carry basic services (e.g., 
distribution pipelines for potable water) and provide protection (e.g., flood walls for 
storm surge) has become critically important. In the late nineteenth century U.S., the 
word ‘infrastructure’, which originated from a French engineering term meaning 
‘beneath-structure’, was used to describe the construction work conducted below or prior 
to roadbeds (Carse, 2016). In the mid to late twentieth century, large construction projects 
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became the basis of economic development and the definition of infrastructure expanded 
to mean “the foundation underlying a nation's economy (transportation and 
communication systems, power facilities, and other public services) upon which the 
degree of economic activity (industry, trade, etc.) depends” (Greenwald, 1965). This 
definition includes public works for technologies, organizations, regulations on common 
resources, and built artifacts to support societies (i.e., hard infrastructure) (Slota & 
Bowker, 2017). In the twenty-first century, the word infrastructure has deeply penetrated 
society and is broadly described as knowledge systems, ecosystem, policies and 
institutions (i.e., soft infrastructure) alongside essential services for living and protecting 
people from hazards – not just physical “hard” infrastructure. Furthermore, some 
infrastructure are further specified as “critical”, “assets, systems, and networks, whether 
physical or virtual, … considered so vital to the [nation] that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013). Now, infrastructure, especially in cities, are ubiquitous 
systems that balance nature with humans and shape ways of living. Dams reserve water, 
generate hydro-powered electricity, protect downstream human and ecosystem habitats 
from inundation, and stabilize water flow for mitigating sediment erosion or for dry 
seasons. Roadways and railroads demarcate lands and specific pathways of travel from 
one place to another with long lifetimes – from the New Deal until today and beyond – 
hard, soft, and critical infrastructure are unavoidable shapers of society. 
While the meaning of the word infrastructure changed significantly in the last 
century, planning and development practices, embedded technologies, and the services 
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provided by infrastructure remain largely unchanged in the same time period. Built 
infrastructure (infrastructure hereafter) are planned, designed, constructed, operated, and 
maintained to ensure systems remain functional, safe, and sturdy for long service lives, 
i.e., fail-safe, typically 50 years to sometimes more than 100 years. Many stakeholders 
like politicians, city authorities, safety officers, engineers and designers are involved in 
the development of infrastructure by means of codes, regulations, capital, laws, policies, 
and institutions that guide infrastructure performance against hazards (Rasmussen, 1997). 
The standardization of development practices are codified and intended to produce 
functional, long-lasting systems with acceptably low risks of failures (Olsen, 2015). 
Although contemporary design standards provide greater consistency and reliability than 
in the 1930s, development practices themselves have remained stagnant over time and 
have yet to match the dynamism of modern society. For example, approaches to 
managing infrastructure risks by calculating possible hazards, and basing designs on 
acceptable tolerances have not changed much since their initial inception in the 1960s 
(Olsen, 2015). Traditionally, engineers design for probable conditions to ensure a fail-
safe system and incorporate safety margins to account for unknowns beyond the 
predictable risks. Risk predictions are often based on historical observations and 
statistical analysis, which then are translated into frequency terms or annual exceedance 
probability (AEP) of specific events (Kennedy & Paretti, 2014). While these historical 
development practices appear effective for constructing reliable infrastructure, the 
breadth of hard, soft, and critical systems are not often considered. Associated 
infrastructure developed to reduce predicted risks may have the unintended consequence 
of increasing risk to unpredicted events. For example, elevated levees give people the 
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confidence of being protected against flood in a low lying area so as to build houses, 
when, in fact, floods surpassed the predicted intensity, the risk of unintended levee breach 
may cause extensive damages to the area. Advancing new development practices that 
consider the breadth of complexity in contemporary use of the word infrastructure is 
necessary to face future challenges. 
2.1.2. Infrastructure in a future of non-stationary climate 
A key limitation of historical infrastructure development practices is their 
inability to adapt to recent volatility in climate. During the development process, 
weather-related hazards are often expressed as prepackaged datasets and charts showing 
the statistics on temperature, precipitation, wind speed, and etc. that engineers use to 
characterize the intensity of weather events (e.g., a 100-year event) to be used as an 
operational threshold. Given the recent variability in weather, these models have not been 
useful in planning infrastructure performance for risks under a changing and 
unpredictable environment. Future climate projections are not required in planning and 
strategic decision-making activities despite years of data and model development from 
the scientific community (Lempert, 2016; Olsen, 2015; Shortridge, Guikema, & Zaitchik, 
2017; Weaver et al., 2013). Infrastructure design standards and the infrastructure 
themselves remain difficult to change even when political, social, economic, and 
environmental systems change around them (Chester & Allenby, 2018). The result is that 
dams, pipelines, roadways, power plants, and other infrastructure manage risks like 
antiquated systems, rather than transcend them. 
Meeting the challenge of unprecedented weather extremes requires new 
infrastructure development, operation, and management practices. A fundamental 
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component of engineering development involves predicting or characterizing future 
conditions with sufficient precision that the consequences of design choices can be 
evaluated. For example, spillways are designed with the intent of safely managing 100-
year frequency flood. The traditional approach for engineering design is to assume that 
the characteristics of future events will resemble the past, and that the past can be 
represented by a sample of observations drawn from the same physical process from 
which the future will be predicted (i.e., stationarity) (Milly et al., 2008). Historically, 
cities have successfully adapted to changing climates by constructing infrastructure 
(Adger & Vincent, 2005), yet changes associated with physical and natural processes into 
the future are adding far more complexity to climate predictions. Conventional adaptation 
efforts may not be sufficient for managing risks in the future if they are simply reliant on 
current models and data. The growth of cities is leading the increase of the magnitude of 
100-year-flood peaks (Konrad, 2003; Moglen & Shivers, 2006), a phenomenon that has 
been observed in urban basins across the U.S. and around the world. Consideration of so-
called “non-stationarity” not captured in historical development practices is important for 
advancing strategies for future infrastructure.  
On-going debate in the scientific community on whether to use stationary models 
versus non-stationary models to predict the frequency and/or intensity of future climate 
extremes highlights the need for infrastructure development practices that adapt to future 
weather extremes. High resolution stationary models can improve the representation of 
extreme weather in certain regions (Mahajan, Evans, Branstetter, Anantharaj, & Leifeld, 
2015). Stationary models are more reliable and practical than non-stationary models  by 
enhancing the credibility of predicted extreme frequencies with uncertainty assessment 
  14 
(Serinaldi & Kilsby, 2015). Still, increasing attention has been devoted to using models 
that take non-stationarity trends into account for extreme frequency analysis by 
incorporating climatic covariates such as time and temperature (Milly et al., 2008). 
Several studies have demonstrated that non-stationary models are a better fit for 
representing the extremes than stationary models, such as using generalized extreme 
value models (GEV) (H. Kim, Kim, Shin, & Heo, 2017) for a target region (Cheng, 
AghaKouchak, Gilleland, & Katz, 2014; Gilroy & McCuen, 2012; Tramblay, Neppel, 
Carreau, & Najib, 2013). Regardless of model usage, the general consensus across 
climate studies is that there are increasing uncertainties in predicting extremes due to 
urbanization and anthropogenic changes. Historical development practices that rely on 
statistical, frequency-based data cannot capture these unpredictable future events. Hence, 
infrastructure development practices meant to manage future disasters must have means 
to embrace this unpredictability by strategic decisions that incorporate knowledge elicited 
by climate scientists, policy makers, as well as engineers for effective infrastructure risk 
management (Gilroy & McCuen, 2012; Katz, 2010; Lins, 2012).  
2.1.3. Resilient infrastructure development and climate change adaptation 
In this work, we build on theories of infrastructure resilience to advance a new 
development paradigm responsive to future weather extremes. Resilience has become a 
popular concept describing managing perturbations, challenges, or shocks in systems. 
The concept is being used in various disciplines including business, psychology, ecology, 
engineering, and disaster risk management (Alexander, 2013; Rose, 2017). Especially in 
disaster risk management, resilience has been highlighted as a key attribute defined as 
"the ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse events" 
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(The National Academies, 2012). In response, resilient infrastructure systems have been 
extensively recognized as an alternative to traditional infrastructure by managing 
unforeseen and unknown threats (S. E. Chang, McDaniels, Fox, Dhariwal, & Longstaff, 
2014; Chester & Allenby, 2018). Given that the notion of resilience has a malleable and 
multidisciplinary nature, there is no clear-cut standard that measures ‘infrastructure 
resilience’. Thus, implementing resilience in practice entails unavoidable subjective 
representation of the concept by decision-makers in consideration of implementation 
context embodying social, ecological, and technological systems in the affected region.  
Numerous studies suggest that resilience is a key feature that societies must 
consider when adapting to non-stationary climate (S. E. Chang et al., 2014; Chester & 
Allenby, 2018; McDaniels, Chang, Cole, Mikawoz, & Longstaff, 2008; J. Park et al., 
2013). However, there is often a gap when communicating resilience from research to 
practice, and from the concept to application on infrastructure development. There are 
few studies that explore how resilience is interpreted and perceived by practitioners or 
suggest a guiding decision framework that promotes resilient infrastructure (DeVerteuil 
& Golubchikov, 2016; Meerow & Stults, 2016). Resilient infrastructure development 
requires the consideration not only of biophysical but also social and institutional factors 
such as institutional capacity, spatial variability, social vulnerability, and level of 
serviceability of existing infrastructures. Decision-makers who govern climate adaptation 
and infrastructure development strategies are in the position to understand these complex 
factors. However, there is a lack of understanding how to incorporate this intricacy of 
decision context departing from the current infrastructure design standard and 
development practices. Thus, it is important to suggest a new infrastructure development 
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paradigm recognizing how resilience, which is conceptually defined and promoted by 
researchers in various disciplines, can be pragmatically embedded in developing resilient 
infrastructure system. 
We propose the use of the recently introduced concept of “safe-to-fail” as a 
guiding decision approach for developing resilient infrastructure system under non-
stationary climate, which encourages decision-makers to engage with dilemmas of 
infrastructure risk management through assessing institutional capacity responding to 
various types of failure consequences. Among the few strategies suggested for 
developing resilient infrastructure systems (J. Park et al., 2013), a “safe-to-fail” approach 
is becoming increasingly attractive to communities vulnerable to natural disasters and 
non-stationary climate risks (Y. Kim et al., 2017a; Tye et al., 2015). Safe-to-fail 
infrastructure development aims to guide infrastructure investment and design for 
unpredicted risk scenarios and build adaptive capacity for affected communities. The 
safe-to-fail infrastructure development can also support decision-makers to consider 
resilience in social, ecological, and technological dimensions by engaging with local 
governments, practitioners, community members, and utility owners, because they face 
“infrastructure trolley problem” situations where future infrastructure failures will affect 
stakeholders in unequal ways. Safe-to-fail can guide these decisions by anticipating 
infrastructure failures to ensure controlled aftermaths, and thus, help decision- makers be 
more strategic in infrastructure development process. This includes guidance on how 
much to invest in infrastructure development, what infrastructure functions to maintain, 
where to direct the impact of failures, which assets and values to prioritize for protection, 
and how and when to recover from disruption, and which organization to react at 
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emergency. We establish a guiding decision paradigm of safe-to-fail for infrastructure 
systems and discuss how to manage failure consequences. 
2.2. What is safe-to-fail? 
The concept of safe-to-fail originates from green infrastructure and safety science 
literature (Lister, 2007; Möller & Hansson, 2008). Both the green infrastructure and 
safety science perspectives are valuable for new decision theory since they accept 
unexpected failures as inevitable. Yet, there is no consensus on what failure means or 
how this concept guides the development of resilient infrastructure. In particular, green 
infrastructure and safety science literature emphasize different design objectives, namely: 
i) experimental design strategies that expect a failure, and ii) a system that fails while 
causing minimum harm. Here we overview the existing literature and more precisely 
define relevant concepts to support safe-to-fail infrastructure development and its 
decision paradigm. 
2.2.1. The emerging concept of safe-to-fail 
Green infrastructure literature focuses on small-scale design innovations with 
expectation of innocuous failures (i.e., trial and errors and learning-by-doing) and 
strengthening the ecological value of infrastructure (Ahern, 2011; Lister, 2007; Novotny, 
Ahearn, & Brown, 2010b). Failure in this sense is an experience that can be useful in the 
future, so an adaptive approach is limited by reliable experiments to planning and design 
where failure impacts can be naturally absorbed in the ecosystem (Lister, 2007; Novotny 
et al., 2010b). Green infrastructure studies suggest that science, professional practice, and 
stakeholder participation need to be integrated with urban development to achieve 
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intended ecosystem services (Ahern, Cilliers, & Niemelä, 2014). Specific examples that 
demonstrate this perspective are green infrastructure and low impact development 
practices such as permeable pavements, bioswales, and urban tree canopies that capture 
rainfall and attenuate drainage flows (Ahern, 2011).  
The safety science perspective argues that reducing risks and adding safety 
barriers are necessary to contain the impact of infrastructure failure within designed 
system tolerances (Butler et al., 2014; Möller & Hansson, 2008; Mugume, Gomez, Fu, 
Farmani, & Butler, 2015). Failure here means service disruptions, and thus, these studies 
tend to focus on system recovery practices. Particular examples that illustrate this 
perspective are underground nuclear waste repositories (Möller & Hansson, 2008) and 
storage tanks or parallel pipes in urban drainage systems (Mugume et al., 2015). This 
characterization of safe-to-fail includes risk analysis and critical infrastructure security 
studies which emphasize awareness of unforeseen risks (Blockley, Agarwal, & Godfrey, 
2012; Boin & McConnell, 2007). A study of critical infrastructure crisis management 
based on risk analysis underlines the adaptive behavior of infrastructure managers in an 
effective and rapid response to an aftermath of system breakdown (Boin & McConnell, 
2007). Another study calls on engineers to recognize the ‘low-chance but potentially 
high-impact’ risks arising from interdependencies of complex infrastructure where the 
system behavior may not be fully understood, and to design the system as robust to 
unforeseen risks (Blockley et al., 2012). This safe-to-fail framing in safety science 
recognizes unpredicted risks that may cause a rare system break-down and a need of 
processes to ensure systems degrade in a way that allows some control of the safety of 
people. In the resilience engineering perspective, the risk-based approach is further 
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questioned by Park et al. by advocating for a resilience-based approach that advances 
from a fail-safe overconfidence mentality of large and robust infrastructure that leads to a 
lack of failure preparations (J. Park et al., 2013; Jeryang Park, Seager, & Rao, 2011). 
What is missing from current safe-to-fail literature is an operational definition of 
infrastructure failure. While the goal of safe-to-fail literature has largely been to explore 
design strategies in the areas of green infrastructure and safety science to better manage 
infrastructure performance under risks, there is disagreement on what infrastructure 
failure or safe-to-fail means. Without a clear definition of failure, the current literature is 
insufficient to address climate non-stationarity. For instance, novel green infrastructure 
practices provide additional ecosystem services such as multifunctionality (Ahern et al., 
2014), however, studies do not elucidate how the additional features control failure 
consequences in uncertain futures. 
2.2.2. Infrastructure failure 
Currently in infrastructure planning, the word “failure” is almost exclusively 
considered in prevention activities. We refer to current infrastructure development 
practices as “fail-safe” because they focus on making “failure” a rare and preventable 
event as long as plans and designs are followed and maintained. We extend this notion to 
define infrastructure failure in two parts: (1) when infrastructure stop serving its intended 
service, and (2) when infrastructure disruption by a hazard causes social, economic, and 
environmental impact. Type-1 failures arise when infrastructure are overwhelmed by 
predicted risks or discontinues its intended function, e.g., failure to convey excessive 
rainfall runoff through the drainage structure due to limited pipe capacity. Type-2 failures 
arise when infrastructure are overwhelmed by consequences of Type-1 failure resulting in 
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severe damage to the system itself, ecosystem services, physical assets, and livelihood. 
While fail-safe is focused on avoiding Type-1 failure, we argue that safe-to-fail requires 
us to consider Type-2 failures as well in the development process and to re-evaluate the 
risks, particularly in situations where Type-2 failures occur without knowing the cause or 
prognosis of Type-1 failures due to an unforeseeable threat. 
We argue that catastrophic failures occur in contemporary fail-safe infrastructure, 
not because of a lack of data on potential risks, but a lack of consideration for the 
consequences caused when infrastructure themselves fail. Our definition of infrastructure 
failures responds to the uncertainty of future climate risk by focusing attention on 
understanding consequences when infrastructure services are lost rather than the reason 
the services are lost in the first place. A number of studies have demonstrated the 
significance of understanding conceivable impacts of infrastructure failure, i.e., Type-1 
failure and resulting Type-2 failure, highlighting the relationships of infrastructure 
service loss and its consequences (Aromar Revi et al., 2014; Wilbanks & Fernandez, 
2014). 
 When infrastructure fail to control floods: destruction of properties and public 
infrastructure, contamination of water sources, water logging, loss of business and 
livelihood options, and increase in water-borne and water-related diseases. 
 When infrastructure fail to mitigate extreme heat: exacerbation of urban heat 
island effects, heat-related health problems, increased air pollution, increase in 
energy demand for warm season cooling. 
 When infrastructure fail to secure water resources: increase water shortages, 
electricity shortages (where hydropower is a source), water-related diseases 
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(through use of contaminated water), food prices and food insecurity from 
reduced supplies.  
 When infrastructure fail to protect coastal area from storm surge: effects on 
populations, property, coastal vegetation and ecosystems, threats to commerce, 
business, and livelihoods. 
 When infrastructure fail to manage power and energy networks: electricity 
shortages, propagating failure across multiple systems due to strong 
interdependency of the power grids with other infrastructure systems (e.g., water 
distribution system uses electric power to pump water, transit networks, electric 
power plants, ICT). 
 When infrastructure fail to support transportation: impact on mobility on 
livelihood (e.g. daily commute) and related economy (e.g., freight and retail 
industry, fuel delivery for plants), loss of evacuation route, emergency services. 
Understanding infrastructure failure in terms of Type-1 and Type-2 failures 
expands upon existing safe-to-fail literature to guide infrastructure development 
practices. When infrastructure failure is discussed in existing literature, it often refers to 
structural disruption, component malfunction, operational error, and physical breakdown 
(Blockley et al., 2012; Möller & Hansson, 2008). These failures are derived from a 
development perspective that understands infrastructure not as ubiquitous systems, but as 
composed of multiple elements performing isolated tasks. We redefine failure to focus on 
the service disruptions caused by infrastructure losses, and expand this perspective to 
include the intended or unintended consequences infrastructure may bring to affected 
populations and regions. We further argue that failures occur when infrastructure 
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compromise or stop functioning regardless of the cause, rather than a breakdown in a 
particular part of structure. We build upon resilience scholarship that examines 
infrastructure as systems rather than isolated parts. In this respect, there is less 
importance on calculating the exact probability of extreme climatic risks or component 
losses in infrastructure design, because the definition of Type-1 and Type-2 failures are 
not contingent on initiating events. Thus, both stationary and non-stationary models of 
future climate risks can be considered in infrastructure development practices through 
this definition. 
2.2.3. Defining safe-to-fail and fail-safe infrastructure 
Whereas several authors discuss the concept of safe-to-fail, no studies have 
systematically assessed the implications that the safe-to-fail concept has on infrastructure 
development practices. We assert that this is due to both a lack of definition of 
infrastructure failure and a lack of addressing how safe-to-fail infrastructure supports 
adaptation to changing and unforeseeable future climate. Using our definition of failure, 
the important features delineating fail-safe and safe-to-fail development are the different 
decision approaches for incorporating failure consequences that infrastructure are 
designed for. 
2.2.3.1. Fail-safe 
We define fail-safe infrastructure as built systems that are designed to avoid 
failure and to be fully functional up to safety thresholds, but lose all function when 
thresholds are exceeded. Under the fail-safe approach, a given system is characterized in 
one of two states: functioning or failed. Fail-safe infrastructure maintains the functioning 
state at all costs, and failure is typically understood as losing system function, i.e., Type-1 
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failure. The stability of fail-safe infrastructure ensures their services (e.g., flood 
protection) available in the near-term, yet in unpredictable future events like natural 
disasters may cause catastrophic service losses. This means fail-safe infrastructure is 
unable to manage unintended consequences because they are developed to be robust in 
the near-term (10-30 years) and are difficult to maintain and at greater risk of failure in 
the long-term (40-100 years). The consequences of fail-safe infrastructure failure is often 
catastrophic because these consequences do not inform design. Risks that transcend 
designed safety thresholds thereby cause significant damages to the infrastructure itself 
and other dependent systems. After-failure actions for fail-safe systems are usually 
rebuilding and restoration back to the previous functioning state. 
Historical and current infrastructure development practices are fail-safe as the 
consequences of failure are not considered during development process. Current 
infrastructure focus on optimizing the service delivery given financial constraints and 
safety thresholds. This development approach is incomplete as large infrastructure with 
low probability of failure, long-lifetimes, and oversized to handle unforeseen threats will 
inevitably fail. The fail-safe approach emphasizing near-term reliability and risk 
management may only increase future damages, as the larger and more permanent an 
infrastructure is, the greater the damages caused by its failure (Jeryang Park et al., 2011). 
While incorporating failure consequences in risk analysis may seem feasible, even the 
best models cannot fully prescribe future non-stationarities including extreme weather, 
population growth, social demographics, urban form, and policies (Christensen et al., 
2007; Shortridge et al., 2017). Moreover, model results do not provide an understanding 
of system status when stresses exceed the functional range of system capacity. While the 
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durability or safety of local elements can be improved based on climate model forecasts, 
the consequences of system failure are not computationally simulated. Hence, engineers 
and decision-makers that are involved in multiple stages of infrastructure development 
need to recognize the possible failures that are not captured in models. 
Oversizing, a robustness strategy, has been the primary mechanism used to avoid 
failure (Olsen, 2015) in fail-safe infrastructure. Design standards are a key element to 
oversizing by setting minimum thresholds for robustness that is serviceable, safe, durable, 
and constructible. Design standards reflecting changing stresses to systems such as 
increased storm frequencies and intensities, high variability of available water sources, 
groundwater depletion, extreme heat, and environmental loads can also increase the 
robustness of infrastructure to future climates (Muller, Biswas, Martin-Hurtado, & 
Tortajada, 2015; Slota & Bowker, 2017). However, oversizing is fail-safe because it is 
based on the assumption that failure is avoidable, and will not serve a future with 
unpredictable climate extremes. For example, oversizing is not efficient in non-stationary 
climate conditions where high uncertainties exist, because the analytics of prediction 
models may diverge from the range of design criteria.  
The design standards and development practices used in New Orleans prior to 
Hurricane Katrina exemplify the limitations of oversizing and fail-safe infrastructure. 
Heavy precipitation is the most expected weather phenomenon in New Orleans due to its 
geography. The city enlisted planners and engineers to upgrade flooding protection 
measures such as levees and floodwalls. However, the plan was insufficient to take into 
account the inevitable complexity of interdependent infrastructure (Leavitt & Kiefer, 
2006). Moreover, the infrastructure failures at the scale of what happened by Hurricane 
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Katrina were not considered by engineering design standards because the wind speeds 
were very rare according to the statistical hazard prediction (Boin & McConnell, 2007; 
Wilbanks & Fernandez, 2014). Several national and international reports on infrastructure 
systems highlight the significant need of maintenance and upgrade (Fay & Morrison, 
2007; National Research Council, 2010; OECD, 2007), but maintaining these systems 
only with stagnated standards means that they are limited in capacity to respond to the 
changing environment. Taken together, traditional, robust infrastructure development 
strategies which resist external shocks that disrupt their integrity and/or protect their local 
urban environment could not be expected to survive weather extremes like Hurricane 
Katrina. Climate change further brings to question the efficacy of traditional fail-safe 
development practices into the future. 
2.2.3.2. Safe-to-fail 
We define safe-to-fail infrastructure as built systems designed to lose function in 
controlled ways, thus different types of failure consequence are experienced as expected 
based on prioritized decisions even when safety thresholds are exceeded in unpredicted 
risks. Under a safe-to-fail approach, a given system can fall into at least three different 
states: functioning, limited functioning/contained failure, and full failure with chosen 
consequences. Here, the functioning state is a normal state where the system performs all 
of its intended function within the designed capacity against a predicted range of hazards. 
Limited functioning or contained failure is when the system stops its service and causes 
Type-1 failure, but limit the impact of Type-2 failure within the system. Full failure and 
loss of system function still occurs in safe-to-fail systems, but the consequences of the 
Type-1 failure are controlled to ensure that the overall impact of Type-2 failure (i.e., loss 
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of life, ecosystem, economy, physical assets and disruption of livelihood) are minimized 
based on development decisions. Thus, safe-to-fail development practice requires that the 
system remains adaptable to control the consequences at full failure by recovering lost 
function or transforming to serve new purposes. Safe-to-fail considers unpredicted risks 
caused by non-stationary climate and support long-term climate adaptation (Tye et al., 
2015). Creating safe-to-fail infrastructure systems helps climate adaptation by forcing 
cities to examine their institutional capacity to manage unpredictable risks and to develop 
more adaptive coping mechanisms to future risks. This is possible because frequent, 
controlled infrastructure failures help prevent risky development practices from 
becoming locked-in prior to unpredictable weather extremes and re-assess the calculated 
risks. Moreover, loss of infrastructure services forces city planners and engineers to 
constantly reassess infrastructure service needs to help cope with changing climates 
(Blockley et al., 2012). 
In safe-to-fail infrastructure development, multi-stakeholder engagement is a key 
element for assessing the institutional capacity to respond to infrastructure failure 
consequences. Safe-to-fail infrastructure development combines design standards, 
supporting policy, and stakeholder engagement to create infrastructure where the 
consequences of failure are managed. In a safe-to-fail approach, it is important to plan 
and design for the consequences of both Type-1 and Type-2 failure scenarios. This 
requires incorporating knowledge of multiple stakeholders to take into account the spatial 
context and complexity of interdependent infrastructure systems. It is more 
straightforward to manage consequences in Type-1 failure scenarios, because planning of 
limited system functions and recovery practices is already possible in fail-safe 
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infrastructure development. For example, many infrastructure systems already have 
planned failure operations that limit system function to reduce damages, including 
drainage pump shutdown to avoid overheating and load shedding in power systems. Safe-
to-fail development practices are more intricate, since managing Type-2 failure requires 
consideration of the social, economic, and environmental attributes in the affected region. 
Damages caused by Type-2 failures require multiple stakeholders including practitioners, 
local governments, communities, and engineers to understand consequences and to 
decide how interdependent systems should fail to strategically prepare for anticipated 
damages. 
The “Room for the River” strategy used in the Netherlands is a good example of 
safe-to-fail infrastructure development practice that uses a combination of design, policy 
and stakeholder engagement (Zevenbergen et al., 2013). The city of Lent, where flooding 
has been a chronic problem and was becoming more intense, intentionally expanded 
flood-prone areas into nearby farmland, where the Dutch decision-makers chose to 
transform into vegetated flood buffer during heavy rainfall and recreational parks in dry 
days. When heavy precipitation occurs, high volume of water are diverted from the river 
to buffers and parks. While it compromises the economic and recreational values of park, 
it significantly reduces the overall human loss, and economic loss by catastrophic 
damages. 
Indian Bend Wash, a greenbelt stretching 18 kilometers through Scottsdale, 
Arizona − one of the major cities in the Phoenix Metropolitan Area − is an example of 
safe-to-fail infrastructure by managing the consequences of heavy rainfall events. Instead 
of using a design standard of concrete channel suggested by the Army Crops, Scottsdale 
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practitioners opted for a bioretention basin consisting of parks, golf courses, and other 
activities. The primary function of this vegetated retention area is to infiltrate runoff, 
attenuate flows, and reduce flooding. When a record storm (over-100-year frequency) hit 
the area in 2014, the Indian Bend Wash accommodated excessive runoff in the designated 
wash, reducing the intensity of flooding in nearby areas. When the rain stopped, the wash 
helped drain city streets and neighborhoods (The City of Scottsdale 2004). Indian Bend 
Wash exemplifies safe-to-fail because it serves the same primary function as 
conventional storm drainage systems, but was developed with involvement of local 
practitioners and citizens and further designed to control the consequences when the wash 
stops accommodating excessive runoffs by considering the infrastructural recovery 
capacity of nearby area from flooding. Thus, greater investment in safe-to-fail 
infrastructure is one way to advance current infrastructure development practices to 
manage the unpredictable weather events that climate change brings. 
2.3. Safe-to-fail and the infrastructure trolley problem 
The potential benefits of safe-to-fail development to adapt to unpredictable 
climate risks brings additional dilemmas to infrastructure development. The safe-to-fail 
approach urges stakeholders to make explicit decisions about failure consequences, 
meaning that decisions made today will have a direct connection to eventual undesirable 
futures. The addition of failure considerations in the development process further 
incorporates multiple stakeholders, their context specific needs, and assumptions about 
failure consequences. This complicates already difficult decision-making processes and 
crates dilemmas for infrastructure development. We refer one practical dilemma as an 
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infrastructure trolley problem, i.e., prioritizing the consequences of infrastructure failures 
by choosing winners and losers. This also raises societal and ethical questions regarding 
whom and what should be prioritized to remain safe when infrastructure fail (Cutter, 
2016). 
A practical way to demonstrate this dilemma is by considering oversizing and 
stakeholder engagement activities of infrastructure development in cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA). CBA is a major decision support framework used by governments and 
institutions to organize and calculate social and economic costs and benefits, inherent 
trade-offs, and economic efficiency of a policy, program, or project (Kull, Mechler, & 
Hochrainer-Stigler, 2013). For infrastructure development, CBA provides a quantitative 
way to prioritize risk reduction and service provision activities based on comparing 
benefits of an actual or planned investment with direct and indirect costs due to Type-1 
failures (Table 2.1). In comparison,  
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Table 2.2 shows additional cost categories that are difficult to calculate, rarely 
included in infrastructure development CBAs, and generally associated with Type-2 
failures, including social costs and losses due to business disruption, and intangible costs. 
Fail-safe infrastructure development practices like oversizing are not amenable to CBAs 
that consider these costs presented in Table 2, because it is difficult to know how to set 
design thresholds for Type-2 failure consequences such as homelessness, loss of business 
revenue, interdependent service failures, loss of heritage, and psychological stress. In 
contrast, stakeholder engagement activities common in safe-to-fail development allow 
decision-makers to consult with a broader range of consequences, and may prioritize 
avoiding Type-2 social loss, business interruptions, and intangible costs before calculated 
Type-1 depending on their capacity to manage different failure types and associated 
costs. 
Table 2.1. Cost categories resulted from Type-1 failure and considered in fail-safe 
infrastructure development by design standards (adapted from OECD 2015, 2016; IRDR 
2017) 
Cost category Associated impacts 
Direct tangible costs 
 
Property losses (Residential and commercial) 
Infrastructure damage (transportation, bridges, 
sewage etc.) 
Agricultural loss 
Cost of emergency services and disaster 
assistance 
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Indirect costs 
 
Increase in government debt 
Negative impacts on stock market prices 
Cost of reconstruction and recovery 
Cost of planning and implementation of risk 
prevention measures 
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Table 2.2. Additional cost categories resulted from Type-2 failure and considered in safe-
to-fail infrastructure development by multi-stakeholder engagement (adapted from 
OECD 2015, 2016; IRDR 2017) 
Cost category Associated impacts 
Direct social loss 
 
Deaths 
Missing 
People affected (e.g., displaced, homeless, 
livelihood damaged) 
Losses due to business 
interruption 
 
Loss of revenue 
Increase in unemployment 
Losses due to the absence of public services (e.g., 
telecommunication, transportation, gas, water, 
electricity) 
Intangible costs 
 
Environmental losses 
Health impacts 
Cultural heritage losses 
Psychological stress 
 
The strength of the safe-to-fail approach is that it encourages decision makers to 
assess the different types of costs in their decision context and recognize the acceptable 
costs based on their institutional capacity to manage infrastructure failure, protect 
vulnerable population and critical assets, identify affected regions, and recover from 
failure. The infrastructure trolley problem, based on utilitarian decision theory, suggests 
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that the best decision is to prioritize the needs of many over the needs of few (Bennis, 
Medin, & Bartels, 2010). Fail-safe infrastructure development practices like oversizing 
have implicit bias in how the needs of the many are defined, as they are only possible 
when costs are amenable to calculation. Safe-to-fail offers a transformative utilitarian 
approach by considering a greater range of costs, but introduces the following dilemma: 
being explicit about institutional capacity and failure consequences (i.e., costs) is highly 
context dependent and limits the use of standard design protocols and precedent 
development practices. For example, choosing how to prioritize costs and how 
infrastructure manages Type-2 failures may introduce costs that we are not able to 
calculate, limiting the use of CBA for decision support. Safe-to-fail aims to addresses this 
dilemma by emphasizing stakeholder engagement to rank the relative importance and 
ramifications among different cost categories, and thus, the estimation of overall cost can 
be adjusted in order to focus on prioritizing between different types of cost and the trade-
offs. Still, safe-to-fail cost prioritizations may be in conflict with standard practices for 
managing Type-1 failures indoctrinated in law, and untenable in the near-term. There is 
also no guarantee that this process will work (i.e., result in clear and actionable 
development plans), slowing the adaptation of existing systems to rapidly changing 
climate when simpler and standardized methods could speed up efforts. In addition, safe-
to-fail requires more careful attention of decision-makers to embrace marginalized groups 
in the stakeholder engagement that tend to be more vulnerable to unpredictable risks to 
inform decisions of cost prioritization.  
Room for the River offers a good example of how to overcome this dilemma. The 
Dutch decision-makers choose to divert the high volume of water from the river to a 
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nearby vegetated area when heavy precipitation occurs in order to safely flood the high-
risk areas. This decision compromises nearby vegetated areas during flooding and creates 
direct tangible costs and losses due to business interruption, but prioritizes reducing 
social loss, indirect costs, and intangible costs that might incur due to uncontrolled levee 
failure. Although the project took about 10 years to implement the new infrastructure 
development and risk management practices while consulting with local governments, 
practitioners, engineers, civic societies, and community members, the decisions have 
been well informed to affected regions and population and the project has been evaluated 
as a successful example of long-lasting sustainable infrastructure solution to chronic 
flooding problem. 
2.4. Conclusion: towards safe-to-fail infrastructure development under non-stationary 
climate 
Safe-to-fail infrastructure development supports climate change adaptation 
strategies that consider the uncertainties inherent in climate models and/or risk analysis. 
While climate prediction has improved substantially, there remains significant 
uncertainty in these projections due to interrelationships of systems, nonlinearities in 
biophysical processes, adoption of greenhouse gas emitting technologies, and the 
adoption or lack of greenhouse gas mitigation policy (Chester et al., 2014; Hulme, 2016). 
This reaffirms a need for a new infrastructure development paradigm that manages 
unforeseen risks by building adaptive capacity without compromising the urban systems 
upon failure. Traditionally, infrastructure are designed as fail-safe – they are designed 
against infrequent weather events and such that they cannot fail. Yet when failure occurs 
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the consequences to human life, economic loss and other infrastructure are enormous. 
Risk-based fail-safe approaches are often contingent on statistical analysis of identified 
risk, thus, often do not account for the uncertainties associated with future climate 
change, making them inadequate for resilience. Safe-to-fail is valuable for a climate 
impacted future by introducing uncertain and unidentified future risks in infrastructure 
development. 
Safe-to-fail development connects to the resilience of social, ecological, and 
technological systems, as infrastructure will influence future social, environmental, and 
economic costs incurred by climate change. Cities build infrastructure to adapt to climate 
change, but basing development decisions on climate models (both stationary and non-
stationary) and risk analyses may not serve resilience by resulting in fail-safe systems 
that are robust to Type-1 failures. Safe-to-fail encapsulates these practical engineering 
methods and expands upon them with a multidisciplinary perspective that considers 
failure consequences and Type-2 failures. Safe-to-fail development requires 
consideration of infrastructure’s biophysical capacity (e.g., safety thresholds) and social 
capacities to respond to risks such as institutional capacity, spatial variability, social 
vulnerability, and serviceability.  
Green infrastructure is often conflated with safe-to-fail, but they are different. 
Green infrastructure is a valuable practice enhancing natural processes while delivering 
environmental, social, and economic benefits of infrastructure. However, green 
infrastructure designed without consideration of Type-2 failures are fail-safe. A common 
example is small-scale rain gardens that experience ponding leading to nearby flooding, 
possible health impacts and ecosystem disruptions. Green infrastructure systems designed 
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with Type-2 failures in mind, like bioretention basins in the Room for the River project 
and the Indian Bend Wash, are safe-to-fail. These two examples further provide evidence 
for how to prioritize decisions with broad stakeholder engagement as a means to achieve 
safe-to-fail development. 
Still, safe-to-fail development is challenging because the risks and performance of 
long-lasting infrastructure are often difficult to predict, and approaches to achieve “safe-
failure” may inhibit the use of practical engineering methods. Particularly for hard 
infrastructure, it is challenging to make alterations to adapt to changing stresses post-
construction and development decisions on un-calculable costs. Safe-to-fail infrastructure 
development requires a broader scope of knowledge and decision support than fail-safe, 
and extra steps in the development process to consider context specific information 
including geography, existing infrastructure services, social vulnerability, different types 
of failure cost, and institutional adaptation capacities among others. One approach to 
achieve safe-to-fail is to use multi-stakeholder engagement to help decision-makers to 
determine the acceptable level of "failure" and its cost. Thus, the functions of safe-to-fail 
infrastructure may vary in different cities and regions depending on what assets and 
values are prioritized for protection and what their capacities are for undertaking different 
types of failure costs. Ideally, for every city, a safe-to-fail infrastructure system can be 
developed by deciding whom or what should remain safe during failed infrastructure 
states, with consequential trade-offs between different assets, values, locations and 
people. 
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CHAPTER 3  
INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR URBAN FLOODING 
IN PHOENIX 
 
This chapter is published in the journal Climatic Change as a part of the manuscript and 
the supplementary material. The citation for this article is: Kim, Y., Eisenberg, D. A., 
Bondank, E. N., Chester, M. V., Mascaro, G., & Underwood, B. S. (2017). Fail-safe and 
safe-to-fail adaptation: decision-making for urban flooding under climate change. 
Climatic Change, 145(3–4), 397–412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-2090-1 
3.1. Introduction: Urban growth and infrastructure risk to climate change 
 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) many of the 
global risks of climate change will be concentrated in urban areas (IPCC, 2014). As U.S. 
cities continue to grow by altering landscapes, increasing impervious areas, and building 
more civil infrastructures, roadways in particular are becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
urban flooding (Meyer, Brinckerhoff, Rowan, Snow, & Choate, 2013; Aromar Revi et al., 
2014). Several climate studies predict that the U.S. Southwest - spanning Arizona, New 
Mexico, Utah, Nevada, and California - will be hotter and drier in the twenty-first century 
(e.g., Seager et al., 2007), and that precipitation will occur in more intense bursts (Hunt & 
Watkiss, 2011). 
 The vast majority of urban growth in the U.S. is asphalt and concrete based “gray 
infrastructure”, such as roads, buildings, and parking lots (D. G. Brown et al., 2014; 
Wilbanks & Fernandez, 2014). This type of urban expansion leads to an increase of 
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impervious surfaces and consequently a larger amount of surface generated runoff. 
Stormwater drainage systems, including sewers, detention basins, and infiltration 
trenches, are used to remove runoff by controlling its flow rate and velocity. When 
drainage structures exceed their capacity, water may accumulate on roadways, leading to 
potential damages to properties (e.g., houses, cars and commercial activities) and other 
infrastructures, and cause service disruptions to communities and businesses (S. E. 
Chang, 2016). Roadways and stormwater drainage systems are often closely related and 
interdependent in urban areas particularly when at risk of flooding. In response, many 
cities use storm drainage systems at large scales to manage surface water effectively. 
However, the unpredictability of future weather risks suggests that even redundant and 
oversized infrastructure may be vulnerable to future extreme rainfall that can far exceed 
existing design criteria (Willems, Arnbjerg-Nielsen, Olsson, & Nguyen, 2012). 
 When local drainage structures exceed their capacity to accommodate surface 
runoff generated by rainfall in the system, water accumulates on roadways and cause 
localized flooding. As cities are becoming more structured and urbanized – with more 
impermeable surfaces – their adaptive capacity to increasing surface runoff  during heavy 
precipitation is becoming limited and, thus, they are more vulnerable to extreme flooding 
(Garfin, Jardine, Merideth, Black, & LeRoy, 2013). Furthermore, a number of climate 
studies predict that the U.S. will experience more frequent and intense precipitation (i.e. 
the heaviest 1% of annual precipitation) in the future. This trend is expected to happen 
even in the regions where the future climate is projected to be hotter and drier than the 
current (Melillo, Jerry M., Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe, 2014) such as 
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the U.S. Southwest including Arizona, and thus external shocks (i.e. flooding) will 
greatly impact infrastructure systems in populated urban area (Garfin et al., 2013). 
 To manage non-stationary flooding risks due to increased and unpredictable 
future precipitation, there have been efforts to (i) quantify changes in future extreme 
precipitation (Dominguez, Rivera, Lettenmaier, & Castro, 2012; Garfin et al., 2013; 
Hawkins et al., 2015; Piras, Mascaro, Deidda, & Vivoni, 2016), (ii) estimate the risk of 
urban flooding (Ashley, Balmforth, Saul, & Blanskby, 2005; Wilbanks & Fernandez, 
2014), (iii) assess the impact of climate change and flooding on urban infrastructures (H. 
Chang, Lafrenz, Jung, & Figliozzi, 2011; Kirshen, Ruth, & Anderson, 2008; Meyer et al., 
2013; Sayers, Galloway, & Hall, 2012; Schmitt, Thomas, & Ettrich, 2004; Semadeni-
Davies, Hernebring, Svensson, & Gustafsson, 2008; Suarez, Anderson, Mahal, & 
Lakshmanan, 2005; Willems et al., 2012), (iv) suggest adaptation strategies for urban 
areas (Arnbjerg-Nielsen & Fleischer, 2009; Fratini, Geldof, Kluck, & Mikkelsen, 2012; 
Keath & Brown, 2009; Liao, 2012; Salinas Rodriguez et al., 2014; R. L. Wilby & 
Keenan, 2012), and (v) improve infrastructure design (CIRIA, 2014; Liu, Chen, & Peng, 
2014). Even though climate models could be useful tools to account for non-stationary 
conditions by assessing the impact of future precipitation events on infrastructure 
performance, their direct use is still challenged by the coarse spatial (25 - 100 km) and 
temporal (24-hr) resolutions, which are not commensurate for hydrological analysis in 
small watersheds (Piras et al., 2016; Willems et al., 2012). Downscaling techniques at the 
regional scale have been developed to improve climate model resolution (Skamarock et 
al., 2012; R. L. Wilby & Dawson, 2013) and adopted in impact studies (Piras et al., 
2016). Still, these estimates of future changes in precipitation extremes are still highly 
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uncertain and provide limited support to future infrastructure design (Hunt & Watkiss, 
2011). Furthermore, there is also the issue of cascading uncertainties introduced with 
each model, from emissions scenarios to the hydrological models used to determine 
impacts (Robert L. Wilby & Dessai, 2010). Novel approaches are needed for 
infrastructure planning and design that incorporate the uncertainty of climate model 
predictions and difficulty in predicting the frequency and intensity of future weather 
extremes. 
 In this chapter, we assess the vulnerability of infrastructure caused by the failure 
of interdependent system and demonstrate how infrastructure service will be disrupted by 
the impact of extreme precipitation. To assess this, we use the case of storm drainage 
system that are interconnected with major roadways in Phoenix, Arizona. 
3.1.1. Background information of case study area: Phoenix, Arizona 
 Phoenix is the sixth most populated city in the U.S. with 1.6 million people (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2016) and is located in the valley of Arizona’s Sonoran Desert with arid 
or semi-arid climate in Southwest U.S. (Garfin et al., 2013) (Figure 3.1). The city 
experienced rapid population growth during the latter half of the twentieth century and 
rapid urbanization came along with it. While this growth bolstered economic and regional 
development, it may have important future social and environmental implications. This 
rapid growth of the region is predicted to continue for decades as Phoenix is projected to 
have 2.3 million residents by 2050 (Maricopa Association of Governments, 2016). The 
growing population and commercial and industrial activities may expose more people to 
future extreme flooding. While the city engineers had developed large and robust roads to 
withstand severe rainfall (Roberge, 2002), extreme weather events are still putting the 
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infrastructure and economy of Phoenix at risks. Since the majority of residents and 
tourists in Phoenix area use cars as their primary transportation method, road 
infrastructure flooding is a serious future threat to the region’s economy. The climate in 
Arizona is characterized by dry and warm conditions for most of the year with extreme 
variability in both temperature and precipitation due to its arid and semi-arid climate, 
where evaporation far exceeds precipitation (Chuang et al., 2015; Sheppard, Comrie, 
Packin, Angersbach, & Hughes, 2002). Precipitation in Arizona is highly variable both in 
space and time as a result of (i) a marked seasonality with a wetter summer season 
dominated by the North American monsoon (Adams & Comrie, 1997) and a drier winter 
season, (ii) high inter-annual variability, and (iii) a strong orographic control (Mascaro, 
2017). A number of climate projections indicate that, in Southwest U.S., the occurrence 
of extreme daily precipitation events during the winter season is expected to be more 
pronounced in the upcoming decades despite decreases in yearly total precipitation, 
causing potential changes in flood frequency (Garfin et al., 2013). 
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Figure 3.1. Map of the Southwest U.S. (left) and city of Phoenix, Arizona (Right). The 
Southwest U.S. spans multiple states, including: Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, 
and California. City of Phoenix is located at the intersection of major U.S. freeways, 
where this map shows the city boundary, major roadways (i.e. interstate highway, AZ 
state route, U.S. highways, principal and minor arterials, and major collectors), 
subcatchments, and the 230 modeled stormwater drain inlet nodes at roadway 
intersections. 
3.2. Methods 
 We performed a flood estimation analysis using the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) Storm Water Management Model (SWMM) to determine which road 
types are susceptible to flooding in Phoenix in current and future climate (blue box in 
Fig. 1). The 2014 storm event – which registered intensities associated with up to a 984 
year return period (~ 0.001 of annual exceedance probability) – but when averaged over 
the city of Phoenix resulted in a 116 year return period (~ 0.009 of annual exceedance 
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probability) for 24-hr storm events, was used as a test case (FCDMC, 2014). We 
collected hourly rainfall observations over 24-hr storm events from 41 gages of the Flood 
Control District of Maricopa County (FCDMC). The EPA SWMM Climate Adjustment 
Tool (SWMM-CAT) was then utilized to estimate the rainfall values in future climate 
conditions for the same event, assuming a return period of 100 years. 
 The SWMM model was then used to simulate the response of the Phoenix 
stormwater drainage system in current and future climate scenarios. Geospatial datasets 
of terrain, impervious areas and maps of the City of Phoenix were utilized to configure 
the model. We modeled the main pipes of the drainage system, identifying a total of 230 
inlets located at freeway, arterial, and collector intersections. These inlets also 
represented the drainage outlets of urban subcatchments modeled in SWMM. The 
rainfall-runoff simulations produced volume, peak flow rate and duration of the flood 
hydrographs at each inlet for 24-hr storm events. The simulations were repeated with 
seven different precipitation inputs (i.e., the observed event and the three future scenarios 
in the near and far future term) to compare flooding results for the historical and future 
conditions. 
3.2.1. Future precipitation projections: Storm Water Management Model Climate 
Adjustment Tool (SWMM-CAT) 
 In this study, we focus on a storm event that occurred in Phoenix on September 8, 
2014. We acquire hourly rainfall data from 41 rain gages located in Phoenix managed by 
the Flood Control District of the Maricopa County (FCDMC). These data are aggregated 
at daily scale to compute the adjustment factors with SWMM-CAT. For the 24-hr rainfall 
accumulations, the FCDMC reported a mean return period across the 41 stations of 116 
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years (FCDMC, 2014). Since SWMM-CAT provides adjustment factors for a maximum 
return period of 100 years, we use the factors associated with 100-year return period for 
all gages.  
 SWMM-CAT is an add-in tool to the EPA Storm Water Management Model 
(SWMM) that allows estimating monthly temperature, evaporation and precipitation, as 
well as the 24-hour rainfall amounts for different return periods in future climate based 
on historical values (L. Rossman, 2014). These estimates are provided through location-
specific adjustment factors, which are multiplicative for precipitation and additive for 
temperature and evaporation. The calculation of these factors is based on statistically-
downscaled climate simulations of nine global circulation models (GCMs) from the 
World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) CMIP3 archive. Within SWMM-CAT, 
simulations are calculated for the A1B “middle of the road” greenhouse gas emission 
scenario, which is characterized by rapid economic growth, peak global population in 
mid-century, the quick spread of new and efficient technologies, the global convergence 
of income and ways of life, and a balance of both fossil fuel and non-fossil energy 
sources (IPCC, 2007). This scenario is from the older generation of emissions pathways, 
SRES – Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). The SRES A1B scenario is 
similar to the newer RCP – Representative Concentration Pathway scenario 6.0 (Melillo, 
Jerry M., Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe, 2014). SWMM-CAT provides the 
adjustment factors in a grid of 0.5 degrees in latitude and longitude (~50 km) for two 
different future time periods, including 2020 - 2049 (‘near future’) and 2045 - 2074 (‘far 
future’). To account for the climate model uncertainty, an ensemble-based approach is 
used to define three climate scenarios, labeled as ‘Hot and dry’, ‘Median change’, and 
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‘Warm and wet’. Starting from the ensemble distribution of annual projected changes of 
precipitation and temperature simulated by the nine GCMs at each downscaled grid cell, 
the ‘Hot and dry’ (‘Warm and wet’; ‘Median change’) scenario uses the adjustment 
factors from the model that is closest to 95th (5th; 50th) percentile temperature change and 
5th (95th; 50th) percentile rainfall change (L. Rossman, 2014). 
3.2.2. Drainage network model in SWMM 
 The SWMM model is used to simulate the rainfall-runoff transformation and 
runoff routing processes in the main pipes of the drainage network in the Phoenix urban 
area for the storm event of September 8, 2014. For this aim, SWMM requires the 
delineation of subcatchments draining into the inlet locations of the stormwater drainage 
system. The Street Transportation Department of City of Phoenix (City of Phoenix, 2013) 
provides maps of the main pipes, which indicates that the drain inlets are primarily 
located at roadway intersections. As a result, we identify a total of 230 inlet locations at 
the intersections of the major roadways, as shown in Figure 3.1. We use the digital 
elevation model (DEM) at 1/3 arc second (~10 m) resolution obtained from the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) to identify the subcatchment area, slope, and width using the 
libraries available in ArcGIS. In addition, we utilize the map of percent impervious area 
from USGS to derive the mean percent value in each subcatchment. We input these 
parameters in the rainfall-runoff simulation in SWMM. We choose the modified Horton 
scheme to simulate the infiltration process using the default parameters in SWMM. Given 
that the model is applied during a single storm event, the evapotranspiration process is 
not simulated. The map of the drainage system of the City of Phoenix also provides the 
diameter of the major conduits (1.28 - 10.06 m) and indicates that their material is 
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reinforced concrete. Based on this information, we adopt a Manning roughness 
coefficient of 0.013 for our simulations. Each of 230 subcatchments draining to the 
corresponding inlet is associated with the nearest rain gage of the FCDMC network. The 
SWMM model is then applied to simulate the response of the Phoenix stormwater 
drainage network using the rainfall observations at hourly resolution and the adjusted 
values in future scenarios. 
3.2.3. Roadway flooding vulnerability evaluation 
 To strategically prioritize infrastructure solutions for Phoenix, we determined the 
type and location of the most vulnerable roads to urban flooding from the SWMM 
simulation results during September 8, 2014 storm event. Urban drainage systems are 
designed to reduce flood damage by carrying stormwater safely away from properties and 
streets. When overflow at drain points are not contained within the drainage network, it 
results in roadway flooding. Drainage pipelines are often planned with the city’s road 
development under or alongside roadways (Schmitt et al., 2004). We confirmed from the 
city’s drainage and roadway GIS maps that Phoenix drainage systems were mostly 
designed to interrelate with roadway networks (Y. Kim et al., 2017b). 
 The rainfall-runoff simulation results returned the total flood volume over the 
event duration at the nodes, which are associated with roadway intersections. 
Specifically, in this model, flooding refers to all water that overflows a node, whether it 
ponds or not (L. A. Rossman, 2015). From this information, we identified roadway 
segments that were connected within one kilometer distance to the intersections reporting 
flooding conditions, their functional classification, and Annual Average Daily Traffic 
(AADT). We identified four different functional roadways (i.e. interstate highway; U.S. 
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highway and Arizona state route; local principal and minor arterials; and major collector) 
and, using this information, we calculated an index to obtain a first-level quantification of 
vulnerability to flooding for each road segment by multiplying the estimated flood 
volume (liter/day) with AADT (cars/day) representing the sensitivity to flooding threat 
and flooding consequences (i.e. level of service), respectively. 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Future precipitation projection 
 We find very similar values across the entire Phoenix area, with a mean increase 
of the 24-hr rainfall depth years of 9.7 %, 9.4 %, and 8.7 % (17.7 %, 17.2 %, and 16.0 %) 
for the ‘near future’ (‘far future’) scenario (Figure 3.2). As an example, the FCDMC rain 
gage with ID 4510 recorded 8.99 cm rainfall in 24 hours; this value is scaled to 9.86, 
9.83, and 9.77 cm (10.60, 10.53, and 10.43 cm) for the ‘Hot and dry’, ‘Median change’, 
and ‘Warm and wet’ scenarios in the near future (far future), respectively by climate 
adjustment factors. Among the three different climate change scenarios, the ‘Hot and dry’ 
scenario leads to the most intense precipitation in both projected future periods. These 
results are in line with climate change studies of the U.S. Southwest which predict that 
Phoenix will likely be hotter and drier while experiencing more extreme rainfall in the 
winter season in the coming decades (Dominguez et al., 2012; Garfin et al., 2013). 
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Figure 3.2. Comparison of projected precipitation for 24-hr at the rain gage #4510 for 
the historical maximum precipitation (September 8, 2014), and two future terms (2020 - 
2049 and 2045 - 2074) in the Warm and wet, Median change, and Hot and dry climate 
change scenarios. 
3.3.2. Flooding intensity and impacts on road infrastructures 
 The SWMM model simulates the flooded volume at each inlet, representing the 
water volume that overflows a node whether it ponds or not (L. A. Rossman, 2015). Due 
to the lack of available observational data, the model performances with observed 
precipitation forcing are qualitatively tested by comparing the location of flooded nodes 
with that of flooded roadways reported by news, social media (i.e. searched with a 
hashtag #Phxtraffic on Twitter page of ADOT) and agency reports (Fritz, 2014; Hendley, 
2014; The Republic, 2014). Results of this comparison are reported in Figure 3.3, which 
shows that flooded roadways are mostly located in proximity or downstream of the inlet 
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nodes whose drainage subcatchments are characterized by positive overflow volume. 
Once tested, we also simulate the flooded nodes in future climate scenarios. 
 
Figure 3.3. The flood map of Phoenix based on simulated 230 storm drain inlets to the 
drainage system for September 8, 2014 24-hr storm event. Actual flood sites reported on 
September 8th 2014 are presented as blue triangles for comparison. Flooding intensity is 
presented in liters. Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) of major roadways is presented 
in cars per day including interstate highway, AZ state route, U.S. highway, principal and 
minor arterials, and major collectors. 
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 Figure 3.4 shows the number of flooded nodes for the historical and the two 
future periods for different classes of total runoff volumes, which are computed based on 
the Jenks natural breaks classification method (Jenks, 1967). While the total number of 
flooded nodes does not significantly increase (22 in 2014, 25 in the ‘near future’ and 28 
in the ‘far future’), the model predicts that total flood volume for a 24-hr period will be 
likely increased at these locations into the future. In the ‘near future’, total intersection 
flooding volume is projected to increase by 21.9, 21.4 and 20.0 % for ‘Hot and dry’, 
‘Median change’, and ‘Warm and wet’ climate scenarios compared to 2014, respectively. 
The ‘far future’ will experience even greater increases in flooding volume, i.e., 35.2, 
34.6, and 32.6 %, respectively. 
 The rainfall-runoff simulation identifies flood conditions in 22 out of 230 nodes. 
A city-wide flood index map based on these 22 flood nodes from our simulation results 
matches fairly well with the flooded sites that were reported from various media sources 
in 2014. The SWMM simulations with future precipitation show that while the number of 
flood-affected locations will not change significantly from 2014, these locations will 
experience increased flooding volume by 20.0 - 35.2 % in the future. The results 
corroborate a number of climate change studies discussing increasing future risk of heavy 
precipitation (e.g., Hunt and Watkiss 2011; Meyer et al. 2013; IPCC 2014), and further 
that vulnerable infrastructures today are predicted to be exposed to more intense flooding. 
As such, considerations for “safe-to-fail” strategies are critical in increasing the options 
available to cities to protect against flooding events. 
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Figure 3.4. Comparison of simulated total flood volume for 24-hr at each node for the 
historical maximum precipitation (September 8, 2014), and two future terms (2020 - 2049 
and 2045 - 2074) in the ‘Hot and dry’, ‘Median change’, and ‘Warm and wet’ climate 
change scenarios. More nodes are experiencing higher flooding volumes with the 100-
year storm event into the future 
3.3.3. Roadway flooding vulnerability 
 The roadway segment-specific vulnerabilities for the event of September 8, 2014 
are mapped for the city of Phoenix in Figure 3.5. The vulnerability results indicate 
several infrastructure design and management considerations. The most vulnerable road 
  52 
types are local arterials followed by interstate highways and local major collectors. While 
major collectors are more likely affected by flooding, they facilitate about 13 times less 
traffic than interstate highways, resulting in a similar vulnerability. Furthermore, even 
though interstate highways and major collectors show similar vulnerability to flooding, 
we expect that the consequences of flooding on these roads are dissimilar. When higher 
classification roads like interstate highways are unavailable for service, it is more 
difficult to provide alternatives or detour routes while achieving the same level of service. 
Also, when high capacity components of infrastructure fail, it is likely that a cascading 
failure occurs impacting other areas of the system. 
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Figure 3.5. Map of Phoenix roadways vulnerability to flooding for the event of September 
8, 2014. Red networks are the most vulnerable roads in terms of daily traffic loads and 
flooding volume. White coded roads are identified as being unlikely affected by drainage 
flooding. 
3.4. Conclusion 
 In this study, we suggest to assess the risk coming from extreme weather events 
by infrastructure vulnerability assessment based on the serviceability of infrastructure and 
the intensity of extreme weather event. Although the common approach of risk analysis 
by risk triplets: threat x threat probability x consequences attempts to include the impact 
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of threat by including the consequences in the risk calculation, this consequence is often 
limitedly considered for the hindered infrastructure system performance. What is missing 
in current risk analysis is the extent of consequences from infrastructure failure that are 
experienced by population that the infrastructure serve, surrounding environment, and the 
interdependent system to them. Through our Phoenix roadway flooding vulnerability 
study, we demonstrate one approach to examine the extended consequences of 
infrastructure failure by evaluating the impact of storm drainage failure tolerated by the 
interdependent roadway system, thus the service interruption that are experienced by the 
local traffic. 
 The roadway flooding vulnerability result implies several considerations for 
Phoenix infrastructure design and management. While major collectors experience the 
higher peak flow rates during flood events, they facilitate 13 times less traffic than 
interstate highways, resulting in a low vulnerability score. Principal arterials are the most 
vulnerable to urban flooding and interstate highway and minor arterials follow. Even 
though interstate highway and minor arterial show similar vulnerability to flooding, we 
expect the consequences of flooding impact on these roads are dissimilar. When larger 
roads like interstate highway are unavailable for service or damaged from flooding, it is 
more difficult to provide alternative or detour routes without affecting the original level 
of service for the detour link. Moreover, since it is also a busier road type than minor 
arterial, it will affect more people’s mobility by its service deterioration. Also, when the 
large robust infrastructure that is designed unlikely to fail fails, it is likely to be a 
cascading failure that impacts the entire system than being resilient to failures within the 
system. The next chapter shows how these issues are captured in the MCDA to support 
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the decision making process considering different characteristics and functions of 
infrastructure. 
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CHAPTER 4  
DECISION-MAKING WITH RESILIENCE STRATEGIES FOR SAFE-TO-FAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
This chapter is published in the journal Climatic Change as a part of the manuscript and 
the supplementary material. The citation for this article is: Kim, Y., Eisenberg, D. A., 
Bondank, E. N., Chester, M. V., Mascaro, G., & Underwood, B. S. (2017). Fail-safe and 
safe-to-fail adaptation: decision-making for urban flooding under climate change. 
Climatic Change, 145(3–4), 397–412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-2090-1 
4.1. Introduction: “Safe-to-fail” and “fail-safe” infrastructures 
 Focusing explicitly on risk-based approaches to infrastructure design is 
insufficient for managing future extreme flooding events. Currently, the primary way to 
assess potential flood damages due to extreme weather is risk analysis. This approach is 
based on the risk triplet – threats × threat probability × consequences (Kaplan & Garrick, 
1981) – where the estimation of threats, threat probabilities, and consequences is often 
based on historical data. Flood risk management uses the same fundamental approach via 
calculating risks with historical data and developing flood management and infrastructure 
solutions across the largest breadth of identified threats. Thus, proposed solutions are 
often large, gray infrastructures with low probability of failure, instantiated for decades, 
and oversized to handle unforeseen threats. Common examples of these types of 
infrastructures include concrete levees, dams, retention basins, culverts, and canals. 
 Despite the anticipated use of risk management for infrastructure adaptation to 
climate change (National Research Council (U.S.) Committee on Climate Change and 
  57 
U.S. Transportation, 2008; Transportation Research Board, 2011), the risk management 
approach is incomplete in an uncertain future climate scenario. Risk-based approaches do 
not incorporate an understanding of what may happen when risk mitigation solutions 
themselves fail (e.g., failure to hold rainfall runoff within the drainage structure). Failure 
in this sense is the catastrophic response when flooding solutions break down and cannot 
serve their intended purpose. Frequently, the larger and more permanent an infrastructure 
is, the greater the damages caused by its failure (Jeryang Park et al., 2011). The damages 
experienced in the wake of Hurricane Katrina emphasize this fact, as a false sense of 
security provided by large levees amplified overall damages to the city (Jeryang Park et 
al., 2011). While incorporating these consequences in risk analysis may seem feasible, as 
discussed above, even the best models lack the precision to fully estimate future extreme 
weather, population growth, social demographics, urban form, and policies (Christensen 
et al., 2007; Shortridge et al., 2017). Instead, climate change adaptation requires a new 
approach to infrastructure design that, while recognizing and managing risk, focuses on 
adaptive solutions that, in the event of failure, do not compromise the entire urban 
system, i.e., “safe-to-fail”. 
 Safe-to-fail” is largely discussed within the climate adaptation community and we 
suggest that the framework be adopted specifically within resilience-based infrastructure 
design. While “safe-to-fail” should be more critically examined as a resilience strategy, 
herein we do not propose a new definition of “safe-to-fail”. Instead, the purpose of this 
work is to provide guidance for how to apply “safe-to-fail” for infrastructure resilience by 
combining climate models, infrastructure engineering methods, and decision analysis. 
Our “safe-to-fail” design support framework considers different characteristics and 
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failure modes of the infrastructures studied and demonstrates its feasibility by applying it 
to a case study of urban flooding. To manage future floods, several authors promote using 
fewer “fail-safe” and more “safe-to-fail” flooding solutions (Ahern, 2011) by 
transitioning from risk-based to resilience-based infrastructure design paradigms 
(Eisenberg et al., 2014; Linkov et al., 2014; J. Park et al., 2013). A work by Ahern (2011) 
argues that previous notions of urban sustainability emphasized durable and stable urban 
form that could persist for generations. In contrast, a focus on non-equilibrium conditions 
like those projected with climate change models emphasizes a “safe-to-fail” perspective 
to anticipate, contain, and minimize unprecedented and unexpected events (Ahern, 2011). 
 A “safe-to-fail” design strategy embraces the inevitability of unforeseen extreme 
weather by centering design decisions on urban resilience characteristics – the adaptive 
capacity of the urban system (Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016). Adaptive capacity refers 
to the ability to respond to inevitable and unexpected threats by facilitating desired 
infrastructure services. This definition of resilience corresponds with the desired 
characteristics of “safe-to-fail” infrastructure, as a transition from a “fail-safe” to “safe-
to-fail” design requires a corresponding perspective, including: 
 Focusing on maintaining system-wide critical services instead of preventing 
component failure (Möller & Hansson, 2008). 
 Minimizing the consequences of the extreme event rather than minimizing the 
probability of damages (J. Park et al., 2013). 
 Privileging the use of solutions that maintain and enhance social and ecosystem 
services (Ahern, 2011).  
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 Designing decentralized, autonomous infrastructure systems instead of 
centralized, hierarchical systems (J. Park et al., 2013). 
 Encouraging communication and collaboration that transcend disciplinary 
barriers rather than involving multiple, but distinct disciplinary perspectives 
(Ahern, 2011; Tye et al., 2015). 
Moreover, embracing this perspective requires a broader range of decision-making 
criteria that influence recoverability and adaptive capacity of systems than risk-based 
approaches, including: preserving ecosystem services, providing social equity, enabling 
innovation, and improving catastrophe response processes. 
 The majority of the discussion focuses on “fail-safe” design strategies, i.e., 
strategies that strengthen infrastructure against more intense environmental conditions. A 
key hypothesis adopted to develop “fail-safe” strategies is climate stationarity, yet 
climate change studies indicate the potential need to reconsider this assumption (Milly et 
al., 2008; Solecki & Rosenzweig, 2014). A few studies have examined the necessity of 
infrastructure planning and design for climate change adaptation, yet none has fully 
explored “safe-to-fail” strategies for fostering climate change adaptation and resilience in 
urban areas, i.e., strategies that allow infrastructure to fail in its ability to carry out its 
primary function but control the consequences of that failure. 
 As “safe-to-fail” infrastructure design is a relatively new concept, little 
information exists as to how to apply the concept broadly to infrastructure, or specifically 
in the context of stormwater. Moreover, we argue that existing literature does not clarify 
“fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” concepts in a manner useful for deciding between similar 
roadway flooding solutions. As such, we focus on the conceptual and qualitative 
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differences between systems employing one design concept over the other, such as “fail-
safe” systems that are prone to rare catastrophic failures where “safe-to-fail” systems are 
adaptive to manage catastrophe yet suffer failures more often (Ahern, 2011). Different 
authors provide conflicting perspectives characterizing the same design strategies (e.g., 
build redundancy) as “fail-safe” (J. Park et al., 2013; T. P. Seager, 2008) and “safe-to-
fail” (Ahern, 2011). To overcome these issues, we developed our own framework that 
identifies the “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” characteristics of flooding solutions already in 
use to adapt roadways to climate change by reviewing existing literature. To generate the 
decision criteria for stormwater infrastructure, we first developed a rainfall-runoff 
simulation of roadway vulnerability to flooding in Phoenix, Arizona, and created a 
catalogue of adaptation strategies including their characteristics. We then developed a 
multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) framework for prioritizing adaptation strategies 
depending on stakeholder preferences for particular characteristics. 
4.2. Methods 
 We use the city of Phoenix and its roadways as our case study location. We 
develop an integrated infrastructure adaptation framework consisting of a quantitative 
roadway flooding-vulnerability estimation and a qualitative flooding solution evaluation. 
The combined technical and qualitative analyses answer the following research questions: 
(1) How might extreme rainfall due to climate change induce flooding of Phoenix 
roadways?; (2) What “safe-to-fail” adaptation strategies exist and what roadway 
infrastructure solutions feature them?; (3) What are prioritized solutions for Phoenix 
considering various resilience-based design perspectives?  
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4.2.1. Integrated “safe-to-fail” infrastructure adaptation framework and Phoenix case 
study 
 An integrated assessment method for infrastructure development in response to 
climate change is essential for decision-making. The integrated assessment method 
facilitates the decision-making process for infrastructure designers and planners by 
elucidating the overlooked interdependent nature of urban infrastructure systems (e.g., 
drainage – roadway systems) and considering resilience-based infrastructure design 
strategies to complement the traditional static analysis of risk-based design (Figure 4.1). 
In order to develop a “safe-to-fail” infrastructure design strategy and decision support 
tool for urban areas, we focused our attention on a single case study in the City of 
Phoenix, Arizona. On September 8, 2014, the Phoenix area experienced a series of 
intense thunderstorms and the largest rainfall on record in 115 years, with a depth that 
reached 8.38 cm over 24 hours (National Weather Service Forecast Office, 2014). During 
this event the area experienced rainfall with return periods up to 984 years (FCDMC, 
2014). The resulting runoff flooded 200 houses and 30 roads. Vehicles on interstate 
highway 10 were submerged because one of the pumping stations experienced 
unexpected failure. This example demonstrates the “fail-safe” nature of highway 
infrastructure and that decisions made on historical risk analysis data can result in 
cascading system failure when an unexpected component failure occurs. 
  62 
 
Figure 4.1. A schematic diagram of the integrated “safe-to-fail” infrastructure 
adaptation framework, the framework combines multiple assessments, including flooding 
projection, infrastructure vulnerability assessment, and multi-criteria decision analysis 
(MCDA) supporting adaptation strategy decision making. 
4.2.2. Flooding solution database 
 We assess 26 climate change adaptation case studies and produce a list of 31 
distinct roadway flooding solutions, i.e., processes, infrastructures, and system design 
considerations (Table 4.1). We use Google Scholar search engine (“Google Scholar,” 
2016) and Web of Science database (“Web of Science,” 2016) to identify academic 
literature that discuss “fail-safe” versus “safe-to-fail” and risk versus resilience-based 
design strategies. We review these articles to collect a list of “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” 
characteristics that support climate change adaptation. Then, we use Environment 
Complete (“Environment Complete,” 2016), GeoRef (“GeoRef,” 2016), Web of Science 
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(“Web of Science,” 2016), Ecological Society of America Publications (“Ecological 
Society of America Publications,” 2016), EDP Sciences (“EDP Sciences,” 2016), and 
GreenFILE (“GreenFILE,” 2016) to identify climate change adaption case studies for 
roadway flooding. In addition to scholarly and peer-reviewed publications, we explore 
municipal websites for US-based transportation and roadway infrastructure case studies, 
including cities near Phoenix within Maricopa County, Los Angeles, New York City and 
Chicago among others. We review these articles to develop a database of infrastructure 
roadway flooding solutions for Phoenix. Table S1 lists a database of 31 potential roadway 
flooding solutions (i.e., processes, infrastructures, and system design considerations) for 
Phoenix, derived from the academic literature, design guidance, and municipal case 
studies. 
Table 4.1. Roadway solutions identified from climate change adaptation case studies 
Roadway Flooding Solution Source 
Standard Curb Cut (Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; City of Los 
Angeles, 2009; MacAdam, 2012) 
Grated Curb Cut (City of Glendale, 2015) 
Curb Cut Sediment Capture (Chau, 2009) 
Meandering or Linear Swale (CDOT, 2010; Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; 
City of Los Angeles, 2009; Economides, 2014; 
Matsuno & Chiu, 2001) 
Vegetated Bioretention Basin (City of Los Angeles, 2009; City of Phoenix, 2013; 
Economides, 2014; MacAdam, 2012; Novotny, 
Ahearn, & Brown, 2010a) 
Bioretention Cell (CDOT, 2010; Chau, 2009; Matsuno & Chiu, 2001; 
SAH Pilot Study, 2014) 
Planter (Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; City of Los 
Angeles, 2009) 
Porous Asphalt (Chau, 2009; City of Los Angeles, 2009) 
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Porous Concrete (CDOT, 2010; Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; 
City of Los Angeles, 2009; Economides, 2014; 
Matsuno & Chiu, 2001; US EPA, 2000a) 
Structural Grids (Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; City of Los 
Angeles, 2009; US EPA, 2000a) 
Permeable Pavers (CDOT, 2010; Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; 
City of Los Angeles, 2009; Economides, 2014) 
Infiltration Trench (CDOT, 2010; Chau, 2009; City of Los Angeles, 
2009; Gill, Handley, Ennos, & Pauleit, 2007) 
Underdrains (CDOT, 2010; SAH Pilot Study, 2014) 
Activated Floodway (MnDOT, 2014; J. Park et al., 2013) 
Green Roofs (CDOT, 2010; Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; 
Economides, 2014) 
Cisterns (CDOT, 2010; Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; 
Matsuno & Chiu, 2001; US EPA, 2000b) 
Open Channel Conveyance (City of Phoenix, 2013) 
Road weather information 
systems 
(Doll et al., 2014; Matsuno & Chiu, 2001; 
Transportation Research Board, 2011; US EPA, 
2000a) 
Vegetation Management (CDOT, 2010; Chau, 2009; City of Glendale, 2015; 
City of Los Angeles, 2009; Doll et al., 2014; 
Economides, 2014; MacAdam, 2012; Matsuno & 
Chiu, 2001; Novotny et al., 2010a) 
Flow regulation devices (SAH Pilot Study, 2014; US EPA, 2000b) 
Curvilinear Streets (Matsuno & Chiu, 2001) 
Raised Subgrade (Rattanachot, Wang, Chong, & Suwansawas, 2015) 
Chicanes & Bump-outs (Chau, 2009; MacAdam, 2012) 
Dual culvert cells (MnDOT, 2014) 
Multi-span bridge (MnDOT, 2014) 
Discouraging Land Subsidence (Watson & Adams, 2010) 
Traffic Diversion (Transportation Research Board, 2011) 
Infrastructure Maintenance (Matsuno & Chiu, 2001; Transportation Research 
Board, 2011) 
Relocate Service Buildings (SAH Pilot Study, 2014) 
Flood Storage (Gill et al., 2007) 
Street Width Reduction (MacAdam, 2012) 
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4.2.3. Characteristics of adaptation strategies 
 We reviewed “safe-to-fail”, resilience, and urban flooding literature to develop 
“safe-to-fail” infrastructure criteria of potential roadway flooding solutions. From the 
articles reviewed, we identified infrastructure characteristics and adaptation strategies. 
We further determined whether it epitomized “fail-safe” or “safe-to-fail” concepts using 
five categories of comparison criteria adopted from same 10 documents: design 
principles, design objectives, design focus, failure impacts, and design disciplines. 
 From the 10 “safe-to-fail” articles reviewed, we find a total of 19 unique “fail-
safe” and “safe-to-fail” infrastructure characteristics and design strategies. Initially, the 
10 articles list a combined 31 characteristics and design strategies as either “fail-safe” or 
“safe-to-fail”. However, many of these characteristics share similar definitions and 
descriptions despite being presented by different authors and having different names. By 
combining similar characteristics and strategies, we reduce the initial list of 31 to a final 
list of 19 distinct characteristics. Due to conflicting definitions and perspectives among 
authors, we also have to re-assess each criterion to determine whether it epitomized “fail-
safe” or “safe-to-fail” concepts. Using the same 10 articles, we adopt five categories of 
comparison criteria: design principles, design objectives, design focus, failure impacts, 
and design disciplines (Table 4.2). Taken together, assessing the 19 characteristics with 
these five comparison criteria produces a list of six “fail-safe” (Table 4.3) and 13 “safe-
to-fail” (Table 4.4) solution characteristics and design strategies. Due to the qualitative 
nature of processing academic literature, reviewing applied case studies, and assessing 
infrastructure solutions, multiple reviewers are assigned to each document to establish 
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reliability of results, and reviewers discuss all assessments collectively (Al Rasbi et al., 
2016). 
Table 4.2. “Fail-safe” and “Safe-to-fail” perspectives and comparison criteria 
 
Fail-safe Safe-to-fail Source 
Design 
Principles 
Preservation of 
status quo 
Adaptation to changing 
conditions 
(J. Park et al., 2013) 
Mitigation Adaptation (Cuny, 1991) 
Risk management Resilience (Hoang & Fenner, 
2015; Liao, 2012) 
Design 
Objectives 
Minimization of 
failure probability 
Minimization of failure 
consequences 
(J. Park et al., 2013) 
Failure prevention Failure recovery (T. P. Seager, 2008) 
Design 
Focus 
Component System (Möller & Hansson, 
2008) 
Quantitative 
probabilities and 
semi-quantitative 
scenarios 
Possible consequences and 
unidentified causes 
(J. Park et al., 2013) 
Failure 
Impacts 
Rigid/brittle Flexible (Ahern, 2011) 
Rare and 
catastrophic 
Frequent with rapid 
recovery 
(J. Park et al., 2013) 
Design 
Disciplines 
Interdisciplinary Transdisciplinary (Ahern, 2013) 
 
Table 4.3. “Fail-safe” characteristics and design strategies 
Characteristic/ 
Design strategy 
How achieved…? Source 
Armoring By hardening or stiffening a system or component 
to exogenous shocks via the addition of new 
components or functions 
(J. Park et 
al., 2013) 
Strengthening By hardening or stiffening a system or component 
to exogenous shocks via the upgrade of existing 
components or functions 
(J. Park et 
al., 2013) 
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Oversizing Increasing existing system and component 
tolerance, capacities, robustness, functionality. 
Increasing existing "fudge factor”-type heuristics 
in design 
(J. Park et 
al., 2013) 
Isolation Reducing connectivity, interdependence, 
functionality, and interactions among system 
components and between systems where those 
interactions already existed 
(J. Park et 
al., 2013) 
Fail-Silence Developing a negative feedback mechanism to 
achieve system self-shutdown in case of 
component or human failure 
(Möller & 
Hansson, 
2008) 
Fail-Operation Enabling systems to continue to work despite 
failures and faults 
(Möller & 
Hansson, 
2008) 
 
Table 4.4. “Safe-to-fail” characteristics and design strategies 
Characteristic/ 
Design strategy 
How achieved…? Source 
Multifunctionality/ 
Flexibility 
Through the design of systems or components 
with extensible functionality, capacity for 
reconfiguration, intertwining/combined functions, 
and time-shifted functions 
(Ahern, 
2011; J. Park 
et al., 2013) 
Redundancy/ 
Modularization 
When multiple elements or components provide 
the same, similar, or backup functions 
(Ahern, 
2011) 
(Bio and Social) 
Diversity 
By using solutions with a greater number of 
forms, behaviors, and responses across a wider 
range of conditions 
(Ahern, 
2011; Fiksel, 
2003) 
Multi-Scale 
Networks/ 
Connectivity/ 
Cohesion 
Creating linkages within systems that support and 
maintain functional connectivity 
(Ahern, 
2011; Fiksel, 
2003) 
Adaptability/ 
Adaptation/ 
Adaptive Capacity 
Increasing a system’s capacity to change in 
response to new pressures and to manage known 
and unknown events. 
(Ahern, 
2011; 
Blackmore 
& Plant, 
2008; Fiksel, 
2003) 
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Efficiency Designing for system functionality with modest 
resource consumption 
(Fiksel, 
2003) 
Renewability/ 
Regrowth 
Enabling the recovery of system or component 
function from endogenous and exogenous forces 
(J. Park et 
al., 2013) 
Sensing Improving the capacity by which new system 
stresses are efficiently and rapidly incorporated 
into current understanding 
(J. Park et 
al., 2013) 
Anticipation Improving the capacity to foresee and predict 
positive and negative future system states 
(J. Park et 
al., 2013) 
Learning/ 
Learning-by-doing 
Creating retrospective feedback loops between 
response actions to assess and develop new 
knowledge and adaptive strategies, 
(Ahern, 
2011, 2013; 
J. Park et al., 
2013) 
Transformability/ 
Transformation 
Enabling the capacity to create an entirely new 
system when existing structures are untenable 
(Blackmore 
& Plant, 
2008; Mu, 
Seager, Rao, 
Park, & 
Zhao, 2011) 
Adaptive Design/ 
Adaptive Planning 
& Design/ 
Innovation 
Opening existing analysis, design, and 
implementation practices to encourage creativity 
with the goal of gaining knowledge for future 
solutions 
(Ahern, 
2013; T. P. 
Seager, 
2008) 
Transdisciplinarity Enabling dissimilar stakeholders to contribute to 
and benefit from a mutual experience 
(Ahern, 
2013) 
 
4.2.4. “Safe-to-fail” scorecard and the decision criteria for solution analysis 
 From our own database that identifies the “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” 
characteristics of flooding solutions already in use to adapt roadways to climate change, 
we develop a “safe-to-fail” scorecard by assessing solutions specific to the classifications 
of roadway infrastructure they affect and their “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” infrastructure 
characteristics. Roads are classified into different categories depending on the volume of 
traffic and types of goods moved. Depending on these classifications, geometric factors 
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(width and number of lanes) and structural designs vary flooding solutions. For example, 
a curb cut is a useful technology for reducing small volumes of flooding on local roads by 
directing water to nearby foliage, but are less useful on major roads with multiple lanes 
that can carry much larger volumes of water. Moreover, paving technologies such as 
porous asphalt are not useful for managing water on unpaved, backcountry roads, but can 
be effective on low-volume urban collector streets. For this reason, we identify the 
relevant functional roadway types for all solutions. In particular, we assess each roadway 
solution for its relationship to seven functional roadway definitions from the Arizona 
Department of Transportation (ADOT, 2016): backcountry road, local road, collector 
road, arterial road, state highway, interstate highway, and U.S. highway. Furthermore, we 
assess each solution for its infrastructure characteristics. 
 We assess solutions using a binary coding method: we assign one (1) if the 
identified solution was implemented to manage flooding for a particular roadway type, 
and zero (0) if those roadway types were not identified in the case study, if the solution 
was deemed irrelevant to a roadway type, or could not be applied. In addition, we assess 
which of the solutions fulfill different “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” characteristics and 
design strategies. Similar to infrastructure roadway classifications, we assess “fail-safe” 
and “safe-to-fail” characteristics using a binary scoring system: a one (1) means that the 
solution exhibits the “fail-safe” or “safe-to-fail” characteristics within the context of a 
specific climate change adaptation case study, and a zero (0) means it does not. This 
assessment is done based on the decision criteria presented in Table 4.2. In total, we 
review 26 climate change case studies and 10 articles on “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” 
concepts. 
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4.2.5. Multi-criteria decision analysis to rank Phoenix flooding solutions 
 We integrated the vulnerability analysis with the “safe-to-fail” scorecard via the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) algorithm 
to generate a ranked list of roadway flooding solutions based on multiple “fail-safe” and 
“safe-to-fail” perspectives (green box in Figure 4.1). The AHP (Saaty, 1988) compares 
the individual scores each solution receives for each sub-criterion, and calculates 
normalized scores across all solutions for each sub-criterion. Based on our solution 
assessments, we adopt the AHP algorithm to generate priority vectors with new 
representative scores for each solution in each sub-criterion. In this work, there are two 
classes of decision criteria for each roadway solution, namely, functional road 
classifications and “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” characteristics Then, using weighting 
factors, we combine each sub-criterion into normalized criteria scores and a final total 
score for each solution. For example, via the literature review we give each roadway 
flooding solution a score for a given functional roadway type. As a starting point we 
begin with interstate highways, and through the AHP algorithm we compare all interstate 
highway solution scores to each other and develop a normalized priority score for that 
sub-criterion. We then apply a weight to the interstate highway sub-criterion against all 
other functional road classifications based on its importance to Phoenix, and combine 
priority scores across sub-criteria to generate a functional roadway classification priority 
vector. We weight, normalize, and combine the functional roadway classification priority 
vector with the “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” priority vector to generate a total solution 
score. Finally, we rank solutions based on their solution scores (Figure 4.2). As a result, 
MCDA allows us to compare multiple, potential decisions, e.g., different potential 
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roadway flooding solutions, by ranking them on their performance across all relevant 
decision criteria and combining criteria scores into a single solution score (Kiker, 
Bridges, Varghese, Seager, & Linkov, 2005). 
 
Figure 4.2. Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) for comparing roadway flooding 
solutions. Sub-criteria for functional road classifications and “fail-safe” and “safe-to-
fail” characteristics receive individual scores by comparing them across all solutions. 
Then, we combine sub-criteria into a single, normalized score through a tiered weighting 
scheme with two levels. We use the final solution scores to develop a comparative 
ranking of all potential solutions 
 Weighting factors introduced in this study for MCDA represent Phoenix roadway 
vulnerability and “safe-to-fail” preferences for solution comparison. We develop weights 
for functional roadway classifications via vulnerability calculation from Chapter 3 and 
“fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” weights on fundamental design perspectives via literature 
review Table 4.2. The functional roadway classification weights represent the impact of 
flooding estimated by simulation models and the percentage of road types affected (Table 
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4.5). The “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” weights represent different design perspectives 
that favor particular solution characteristics ( 
Table 4.6). Normally, one uses stakeholder preferences to determine the relative 
importance of decision criterion. Instead, we developed seven adaptation perspectives 
that represent contrasting “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” characteristics. Three perspectives 
are generic weighting schemes that consider all criteria within each category equally. We 
derived four perspectives based on the work of Ahern (Ahern et al., 2014) and Park et al. 
(J. Park et al., 2013; Jeryang Park et al., 2011) to demonstrate how differing “safe-to-fail” 
perspectives may change recommended solutions. Both Ahern and Park et al. offer 
multiple contrasting “safe-to-fail” perspectives that emphasize different design strategies 
and solution characteristics. For example, work developed by Ahern (Ahern et al., 2014) 
focuses on transdisciplinarity in one instance, yet de-emphasizes it in another (Ahern, 
2011). Similarly, within the same work, Park et al. (J. Park et al., 2013) describe 
contrasting views on catastrophe management – one focuses on design strategies, and one 
focuses on sociotechnical processes. Overall, the three generic and four author specific 
perspectives are:  
 All criteria weighted equally – a “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” agnostic perspective 
 Fail-safe criteria only – a general, risk-based perspective on design 
 Safe-to-Fail criteria only – a general, resilience-based perspective on design 
 Ahern All – a perspective on “safe-to-fail” design using concepts developed by 
Ahern et al. (2014) 
 Ahern Strategies – a refinement on the Ahern All perspective that focuses on five 
design strategies (i.e. multifunctionality, redundancy and modularization, (bio and 
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social) diversity, multi-scale networks and connectivity, and adaptive planning 
and design) proposed by Ahern (2011) on “safe-to-fail” design. 
 Park Strategies – a perspective on “safe-to-fail” design using resilience-based 
design strategies recognizing changing conditions and unknown hazards 
summarized by Park et al. (2013). 
 Park Processes – a perspective on “safe-to-fail” design focused on sociotechnical 
processes developed in resilience engineering literature (Woods, Leveson, & 
Hollnagel, 2012) and refined by Park et al. (2013). 
The seven perspectives are a subset of the many perspectives and values on infrastructure 
design. We used MCDA to prioritize “safe-to-fail” roadway flooding solutions in 
Phoenix by giving weight to 19 resilience characteristic based on these seven 
perspectives. Each of the above perspectives identifies all or part of the 19 possible 
characteristics for resilience-based design as important for “safe-to-fail” infrastructure. 
No perspective suggests that any one resilience characteristic is more important than any 
other, thus we assigned equal decision-making importance (i.e., weight) to each 
characteristic for any given perspective. For instance, the Ahern Strategies perspective 
highlights five resilience characteristics while this perspective does not have proposition 
on the rest 14 characteristics, thus we only weighted the highlighted five characteristics 
equally (0.20). Using the AHP algorithm, we calculated the score of each roadway 
flooding solution for a given characteristic (e.g., multifunctionality) and then combined 
scores based on perspective weightings to generate solution rankings for each 
perspective. Each of seven adaptation perspectives emphasizes different design strategies 
which can result in distinct rankings for roadway flooding solutions. Taken together, we 
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argue that these seven perspectives provide a comprehensive view on “fail-safe” and 
“safe-to-fail” prioritization of design that can inform decision-making for future flooding 
events. 
Table 4.5. Road classification and their weights on flood vulnerability 
Road Classification 
(in vulnerability assessment) 
Road Classification 
(in MCDA) 
Criteria 
Weights 
None in Phoenix Backcountry Road 0 
Minor Collector Local Byway 0 
None in Phoenix Living Streets 0 
Major Collector Collector Roads 0.1701 
Minor and Principal Arterials 
(Local Roads) 
Arterials 0.6347 
Major Collectors & Principal 
Arterials 
(State and US Highway) 
State Highway (State Route) / 
U.S. highway (U.S. Route) / 
County Road 
0.0250 
Principal Arterial 
(Interstate Highway) 
Expressway / Freeway 
(Motorway) / Interstate Highway 
0.1703 
Sum of Weights (must = 1) 1.0 
 
Table 4.6. Seven adaptation perspectives and their associated “Fail-safe” and “Safe-to-
fail” characteristics and their weights used in MCDA 
Characteristic
s 
All 
Criteria 
Equal 
Fail-
Safe 
Only 
Safe-
to-Fail 
Only 
Ahern 
All 
Ahern 
Strategie
s 
Park 
Strategie
s 
Park 
Processe
s 
Armoring 0.053 0.167 0 0 0 0 0 
Strengthening 0.053 0.167 0 0 0 0 0 
Oversizing 0.053 0.167 0 0 0 0 0 
Isolation 0.053 0.167 0 0 0 0 0 
Fail-Silence 0.053 0.167 0 0 0 0 0 
Fail-
Operation 
0.053 0.167 0 0 0 0 0 
Multifunction
ality/ 
0.053 0 0.077 0.143 0.200 0.143 0 
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Flexibility 
Redundancy/ 
Modularizatio
n 
0.053 0 0.077 0.143 0.200 0 0 
(Bio and 
Social) 
Diversity 
0.053 0 0.077 0.143 0.200 0.143 0 
Multi-Scale 
Networks/ 
Connectivity/ 
Cohesion 
0.053 0 0.077 0.143 0.200 0.143 0 
Adaptability/ 
Adaptation/ 
Adaptive 
Capacity 
0.053 0 0.077 0 0 0.143 0.250 
Efficiency 0.053 0 0.077 0 0 0 0 
Renewability/ 
Regrowth 
0.053 0 0.077 0 0 0.143  
Sensing 0.053 0 0.077 0 0 0 0.250 
Anticipation 0.053 0 0.077 0 0 0 0.250 
Learning/ 
Learning-by-
doing 
0.053 0 0.077 0.143 0.200 0 0.250 
Transformabil
ity/ 
Transformatio
n 
0.053 0 0.077 0 0 0.143 0 
Adaptive 
Design/ 
Adaptive 
Planning & 
Design/ 
Innovation 
0.053 0 0.077 0.143 0 0.143 0 
Transdisciplin
arity 
0.053 0 0.077 0.143 0 0 0 
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4.3. Results: Adaptation strategy decision-making 
The combination of literature review, flooding vulnerability assessment, and MCDA 
results show how switching between different “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” perspectives 
changes the recommended roadway flooding solutions. Table 4.7 presents the top five 
solutions for Phoenix roadway flooding for the seven adaptation perspectives based on 
MCDA. 
Table 4.7. Top five roadway flooding solutions for Phoenix, Arizona (RWIS: modernized 
roadway weather information system) 
R 
a 
n 
k 
All 
Criteria 
Equal 
Fail-Safe 
Only 
Safe-to-
Fail Only 
Ahern 
All 
Ahern 
Strategies 
Park 
Strategies 
Park 
Processes 
1 Vegetated 
Bioretenti
on Basin 
Flood 
Storage 
Vegetated 
Bioretenti
on Basin 
Activated 
Floodwa
y 
Activated 
Floodway 
Discoura
ging 
Subsiden
ce 
RWIS 
2 RWIS Discoura
ging 
Subsiden
ce 
Activated 
Floodway 
Vegetate
d 
Bioretent
ion Basin 
RWIS Open 
Channel 
Conveyan
ce 
Activated 
Floodwa
y 
3 Activated 
Floodway 
Multi-
span 
bridge 
RWIS RWIS Vegetated 
Bioretenti
on Basin 
Vegetated 
Bioretenti
on Basin 
Vegetate
d 
Bioretent
ion Basin 
4 Flood 
Storage 
Vegetated 
Bioretenti
on Basin 
Open 
Channel 
Conveyan
ce 
Flood 
Storage 
Vegetatio
n 
Managem
ent 
Flood 
Storage 
Vegetatio
n 
Manage
ment 
5 Discoura
ging 
Subsiden
ce 
RWIS Discoura
ging 
Subsiden
ce 
Vegetatio
n 
Manage
ment 
Discoura
ging 
Subsiden
ce 
Activated 
Floodway 
Relocate 
Service 
Buildings 
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 Several solutions appear as most important for the Phoenix case demonstrating 
that MCDA method can be useful to consider the design criteria that are not commonly 
captured in technical design, namely adaptation capacity to climate change. Of the 33 
possible solutions found in literature, only nine appear among the top five across all 
scenarios. This suggests that these nine are the most relevant in regions like Phoenix, 
where future flooding will primarily affect principal arterial, minor arterial, and interstate 
highway roads. Furthermore, of these nine, three solutions (i.e. vegetated bioretention, 
modernized roadway weather information system (RWIS), activated floodway) appear 
more frequently than the rest, suggesting that these solutions satisfy across the “fail-safe” 
and “safe-to-fail” perspectives. The highest ranked solution for the All Criteria Equal and 
Safe-to-Fail Only perspectives is the implementation of a vegetated bioretention basin; 
this solution appears in the top five for all other perspectives as well. Similarly, the 
highest ranked solution for Ahern All and Ahern Strategies is Activated Floodway, which 
appears in the top five for four other scenarios. Based on these results, we recommend 
that Phoenix implement vegetated bioretention basins, activated floodways and RWIS to 
better enhance the city’s resilience to unpredictable and uncertain future flooding events. 
 Differences in recommended solutions reveal the sensitivity of results to 
switching design strategies. Here, we demonstrate how conflicting risk- and resilience-
based design strategies may lead to different roadway flooding solutions. Switching from 
Fail-Safe Only to Safe-to-Fail Only perspectives leads to a reversal in the importance of 
flood storage and discouraging land subsidence to vegetated bioretention basins and 
activated floodway. Switching from Park Strategies to Park Processes has a dramatic shift 
in recommended solutions, with differing highest ranked solutions and only two of the 
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top five being similar between them. The sensitive nature of choosing one design 
paradigm over another emphasizes the need for more comparative and integrative work 
across resilience literature. 
 Despite this sensitivity, there are several consistencies existing among “safe-to-
fail” perspectives which demonstrate the shared resilience-based design approach among 
particular solutions. In particular, reducing the Ahern All perspective to focus attention 
on only the authors’ proposed “safe-to-fail” design strategies (Ahern Strategies) does not 
change the top three recommended solutions. Furthermore, all scenarios except Fail-Safe 
Only and Park Strategies share the same top three solutions notwithstanding reversals in 
the order of their ranks. While these similarities among results may be an artifact of 
context-specific factors such as the focus on roadway flooding and Phoenix, they may 
also be indicative of converging perspectives on specific solution types. Because Safe-to-
Fail Only, Ahern All, Ahern Strategies, and Park Processes produce similar results to All 
Criteria Equal, these three solutions must have the uncommon trait of fulfilling a broad 
scope of design strategies. Idiosyncrasies between “safe-to-fail” definitions suddenly 
become less important, and identifying these transcendental solutions may be more 
meaningful in future work. 
4.4. Conclusion 
 Given the infrastructure-specific flooding vulnerability results, we can prioritize 
spatially explicit infrastructure recommendations that are “safe-to-fail” to non-stationary 
weather extremes. Cities are composed of complex infrastructure systems that are 
interdependent, multi-functional, and increasingly co-located in ways that decentralize 
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much of the hard-infrastructure, thus recommendations for one system can affect others. 
“Safe-to-fail” infrastructure design tends to emphasize resilience characteristics that 
account for the interdependent, complex nature of urban infrastructure including 
isolation, fail-silence, redundancy and modularization, diversity in system responses, 
connectivity across multi-scale networks, and adaptive capacity. Risk-based approaches 
typically design and operate infrastructure in isolation without considering the 
consequences of failures linked from one system to another (e.g. power supply system 
failure to drainage pump failure; drainage system failure to roadways flooding) (Blockley 
et al., 2012). One goal of “safe-to-fail” design is to ensure that unpredicted shocks that 
affect a single infrastructure system do not cause secondary or tertiary impacts to other 
systems. “Safe-to-fail” allows decision-makers to better acknowledge interdependent 
systems in the design stage via failure modes and ensures that infrastructure risks are 
managed interconnected parts. We position multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) as 
an effective way to organize many “safe-to-fail” characteristics and facilitate decision 
making across different urban infrastructure characteristics and adaptive solutions. While 
different characteristics are uniformly weighted within each perspective in this study, 
incorporating multiple stakeholder and decision-maker preferences may lead to non-
uniform and probabilistic weightings that reflect data uncertainty and different 
social/political/technical capacities. Furthermore, the current results are discrete rankings 
of solutions, where non-uniform weighting may generate distributions for the importance 
of each solution which are more difficult to interpret but may provide more useful 
information to decision-makers to evaluate the cost and benefit of “safe-to-fail” designs 
in climate change adaptation. Although outside the scope of this work, future work 
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should focus on incorporating expert opinion in developing weighting schemes and 
identifying the sensitivity of decisions to non-uniform, probabilistic results. 
 While green and low impact development (LID) practices such as bioswales, 
vegetated bioretention basins, and living streets easily interpret “safe-to-fail” with their 
capacity to provide social and ecosystem services in addition to reducing flood impacts, 
gray infrastructure can also achieve “safe-to-fail” features by coupling technological 
constraints with social and ecological well-being (Meerow et al., 2016). Furthermore, we 
define “safe-to-fail” infrastructure as a system that is capable of adapting to uncertain and 
unpredictable infrastructure failures, such as extreme precipitation events, via social, 
ecological and technological interactions (SETs) and adaptation practices. For example, 
in contrast to using a simple LID solution, flooding resilience in The Netherlands is 
achieved through a combination of infrastructure, policy and action. In particular, 
communities in The Netherlands developed more resilient infrastructure systems by 
intentionally expanding flood-prone areas to nearby farmland from the frequent flooded 
river. By using the farmlands as floodways and developing a subsidy for affected farmers 
for lost crop production, local flood management districts were able to redirect urban 
damages to less socially and economically vital regions (Zevenbergen et al., 2013). 
Another example described in detail by Park et al. includes the strategic destruction of a 
levee to control extreme flooding in the Mississippi River Valley in 2011 (J. Park et al., 
2013). The above two examples emphasize that a resilience-based “safe-to-fail” 
infrastructure design is less concerned with promoting a specific technology but how 
systemic interactions of SETs dictate infrastructure feasibility and lowering the overall 
impacts of failure on social, economic and environmental systems through adaptive 
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actions. This characteristic about “safe-to-fail” infrastructure is also relevant for climate 
change actions as the IPCC acknowledge that climate change adaptation is place- and 
context-specific (IPCC, 2014), with no single approach for reducing risks appropriate 
across all settings. Moreover, infrastructure superficially interpreted as “fail-safe”, e.g., a 
concrete levee in the Mississippi River Valley example, can also be “safe-to-fail” when 
managed alongside the adaptive human responses they enable. Thus, risk-based and 
resilience-based design are not mutually exclusive, but rather supportive of each other, 
where risk analysis identifies vulnerabilities and damages and resilience analysis 
highlights systemic dependencies to enable recovery and adaptation (Jeryang Park et al., 
2011). 
 
Figure 4.3. The infrastructure resilience strategies and their sliding scales from “Safe-to-
fail” to “Fail-safe”. (a) The sliders representing the Park Strategies perspective for 
Phoenix evaluated in this study considers “Safe-to-fail” and “Fail-safe” as binary 
categories (blue and green in colors). (b) A hypothetical context-specific perspective that 
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includes stakeholder values suggested by the authors. In practice, strategies may be on a 
spectrum from “Fail-Safe” to “Safe-to-fail” (gradient from blue to green in colors) 
depending on location- and infrastructure-specific context. 
 Despite limited evidence and the authors’ optimism that “safe-to-fail” approaches 
can improve the resilience of infrastructure and the services they provide against climate 
change, the topic remains largely unexplored. We provide some initial framing of how 
certain resilience characteristics fit into “safe-to-fail” versus to “fail-safe” regimes. 
However, it is possible, and likely, that characteristics do not fit neatly into either “safe-
to-fail” or “fail-safe”. Moreover, a “safe-to-fail” infrastructure strategy in one city may 
not be “safe-to-fail” or “resilient” in another city. We imagine that sliding scales can be 
used to identify different perspectives on “fail-safe” and “safe-to-fail” system 
characteristics that are context- and infrastructure- specific, and non-uniform weighting 
of MCDA will help capture these spectrums in decision-making processes (Figure 4.3). 
For instance, “oversizing” is described as a “fail-safe” infrastructure characteristic based 
on the Park Strategies perspective (Figure 4.3 a), as increasing the size of drainage pipes 
does not consider the impact of rainfall-runoff overflow. In contrast, a hypothetical 
perspective proposed by the authors positions “oversizing” as a “safe-to-fail” strategy 
(Figure 4.3 b), as some practical examples of increasing the size of bioretention basins 
near rivers provide “safe-to-fail” flood control (c.f., The Netherlands “Room for the 
river”). We confirm the need of a new design paradigm that rigorously considers 
uncertainty in climate predictions during the decision-making process and primes 
infrastructures to be resilient to unforeseen climate risks. The “safe-to-fail” design 
strategy offers one approach to consolidate the resilient capacity of infrastructure 
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systems, by focusing attention on reinforcing specific infrastructure characteristics in 
order to minimize the consequences of systemic failures. 
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CHAPTER 5  
EXPERT ELICITATION ON RESILIENT AND SAFE-TO-FAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Improving infrastructure ‘resilience’, understood as increasing the capacity of 
infrastructure systems to resist, adapt, or respond to changes, disturbances, and shocks, is 
now critical to climate adaptation (Linkov et al., 2014; National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council, 2010; The National Academies, 2012; UNISDR, 2009). Due to broad factors 
that influence climate change, like urbanization, population change, earth system 
interactions, land use change, technology shifts, and economic growth, there is a rapid 
pace of changing environments in which infrastructure is designed and developed to 
survive. The concept of resilience is promoted by researchers for developing and 
managing infrastructure systems with the ability to withstand or recover quickly from 
difficult, changing climate conditions, even the conditions that are not easily foreseen 
(Biggs et al., 2012; Linkov et al., 2013; Meerow & Newell, 2015; Woods et al., 2012). 
Still, there is a gap in understanding how resilience (and its associated strategies) defined 
and promoted conceptually by researchers is interpreted and embedded pragmatically by 
practitioners in infrastructure development. Infrastructure engineers, landscape planners, 
policy makers, and climate risk scientists (i.e., practitioners, hereafter) are the actual 
experts who make decisions for infrastructure in state, regional, and municipal 
governments that lead to planning and managing infrastructure systems – not researchers. 
Previous studies on resilience demonstrate that the concept needs to be understood with 
an interdisciplinary viewpoint reflecting regional, environmental, economic, and social 
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challenges that practitioners have for climatic risk management decisions (Adger, 2000; 
Cutter, 2016; Hayward, 2013). Yet, most resilience studies neither observe a 
practitioner’s interdisciplinary viewpoint on infrastructure resilience and climate risks nor 
identify how their perspectives may differ from the academic literature. Furthermore, 
there is no straightforward standard that guides decisions for infrastructure resilience nor 
a protocol for developing resilience strategies, and thus, the application of resilience in 
practice often entails subjective interpretation of the concept by local practitioners 
involved in infrastructure development and management decisions (DeVerteuil & 
Golubchikov, 2016; Meerow & Newell, 2015). To better understand how the concept of 
resilience is interpreted in practice and capture the interdisciplinary perspective of 
practitioners on climate change adaptation, new research is needed identifying a 
practitioner’s view of resilience. 
The emerging safe-to-fail infrastructure development concept is a resilience 
approach in academic literature that would benefit from capturing interdisciplinary 
practitioner perspectives. Safe-to-fail emphasizes incorporating resilience strategies that 
reflect the diverse adaptive capacities of infrastructure systems. The premise of safe-to-
fail is that incorporating resilience strategies in infrastructure development will both 
mitigate adverse impacts of predicted risks and prioritize infrastructure failure 
consequences by enhancing certain adaptive capacities to respond to unforeseen risks. 
Research on safe-to-fail infrastructure development suggests the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders to determine the current adaptive capacities of the region to climate risks 
and to identify which resilient capacities should be embedded in new infrastructure 
designs. Among the stakeholders involved in assessing and embedding adaptive capacity 
  86 
in infrastructure systems, city practitioners hold knowledge of the capacity for 
government and non-governmental organizations to maintain, operate, and adapt 
infrastructure systems to climate change via knowledge of current decision 
considerations, design criteria, and the development process of infrastructure. Although 
this knowledge is critical to successful implementation of a safe-to-fail approach, there is 
no work in the literature that links practitioner knowledge to theory to better understand 
how adaptive capacities identified by researchers would be implemented in a real-world 
context. 
Definitions of resilience exist in literature and the perspectives on safe-to-fail 
approach has been understood by researchers, but the understanding of practitioner 
perspectives created by their long-term experience is limited. To investigate diverse and 
subjective perspectives on resilience and its application in safe-to-fail infrastructure 
development, this study utilizes the Q-methodology (see Methods) which allows 
researchers to explore the subjectivity of perceptions on a subject matter. Via the Q-
methodology, this study hypothesizes that the way practitioners prioritize safe-to-fail 
strategies for infrastructure development will vary depending on their knowledge and 
experiences. Furthermore, previous studies on safe-to-fail suggest that practitioners’ 
viewpoints must be understood to succeed at safe-to-fail infrastructure development, 
because these perspectives highlight a nuanced understanding of resilience that is not 
captured in academic literature. For example, in the study of safe-to-fail adaptation for 
Phoenix roadways flooding (Y. Kim et al., 2017a), seven preliminary safe-to-fail 
adaptation perspectives are explored that represent contrasting fail-safe and safe-to-fail 
characteristics. These perspectives, however, are derived only from an academic 
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literature review, and only capture how researchers’ distinctive interpretation of safe-to-
fail promotes different resilient infrastructure solutions for managing the consequences of 
urban flooding. While the results of the Phoenix study demonstrate that differing safe-to-
fail perspectives may change recommended solution rankings for infrastructure design, 
they also suggest that more nuanced perspectives on safe-to-fail development may be 
lacking from resilience literature. 
This study also aims to contribute on an understanding of practitioner’s 
perspectives on resilience and safe-to-fail, thereby providing guidance for infrastructure 
development and climate change adaptation. Current infrastructure design standards and 
engineering criteria do not explicitly consider resilience strategies. Still, practitioners 
have been on the front line improving infrastructure performance to respond to a 
changing environment. These same infrastructure systems already last for decades and 
respond to changing climate without explicit consideration of resilience strategies. This 
implies that infrastructure development practices and strategies endorsed by practitioners’ 
may already embed inherent attributes of resilience. Given that the notion of resilience 
has a malleable and multidisciplinary nature, the objective of this study is to explore the 
pragmatic interpretation of the resilience concept by practitioners and to recognize 
diverse perspectives on adopting resilience strategies into safe-to-fail infrastructure 
development in various decision contexts. 
5.2. Methods 
 
5.2.1. Q-methodology 
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Q-methodology was used in this study to explore the diverse perspectives of 
practitioners on resilience and safe-to-fail. Q-methodology is a research technique used to 
study an individual’s subjectivity (S. R. Brown, 1993) by collecting tables of organized 
statements that represents a participants’ subjective perspective. It was first introduced by 
the psychologist Stephenson in his article “Correlating persons instead of tests” in 1935, 
as a technique that inverses the common correlation analysis (i.e., correlating test 
variables (Spearman, 1904)) by correlating among human subject instead of the test 
variables (Stephenson, 1935). The benefit of correlating persons by Q-methodology 
appears in investigating questions about personal experience and opinions regarding 
insights, attitudes, values, and beliefs (S. R. Brown, 1980; Ellingsen, Størksen, & 
Stephens, 2010). Q-methodology has the strength of both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods, and it allows researchers to explore shared and/or discrete views 
among participants by its structured study procedure and factor analysis technique. Also, 
Q-methodology has a benefit of feasibility in discovering significant viewpoints and the 
range of variability only with few participants to offer a statistical meaningful results (as 
small as 12 participants because each Q-sort product delivers a substantial amount of 
information (Barry & Proops, 1999)). A Q-methodology study typically comprises i) 
development of a Q-sample, a list of statements related to the topic and the study 
question, ii) conducting Q-sort, a hands-on activity of ranking the Q-sample of statements 
by study participants on a quasi-normal distribution table (i.e., Q-sort table), iii) semi-
structured interviews, iv) factor analysis performed on Q-sorts (i.e., persons) not on 
variables (i.e., statements or tests), and v) interpretation of identified factors and 
constructing discourses. 
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This study uses the Q-methodology to explore how resilience and safe-to-fail 
concepts are interpreted and applied in infrastructure development by practitioners. The 
procedure of each step in Q-methodology performed in this study is described in detail in 
the next sections below. To implement the Q-methodology for resilience and safe-to-fail, 
study participants (i.e., practitioners) were asked to perform a series of Q-sorting 
activities (i.e., ranking statements on the Q-sort table) by responding to three questions 
that reflect different decision contexts involving climate change adaptation, urban 
infrastructure development, and past natural disasters:  
1) Question A. Which statements are more/less relevant for promoting infrastructure 
resilience in addressing climate and weather risks from your experience and 
perspective? 
2) Question B. Which statements are more/less relevant for promoting safe-to-fail 
infrastructure in addressing urban flooding in the metro-Phoenix area from your 
experience and perspective? 
3) Question C. Which statements are more/less relevant for promoting resilience 
considering infrastructure failure consequences during the infrastructure 
development process in addressing climate and weather risks like Hurricane 
Harvey? 
 
In addition to asking participants these questions, additional information was 
provided to participants to help guide Q-sorting activities. For Question A, participants 
were provided with a common definition and extended explanation of resilience for 
infrastructure found in academic literature. 
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The National Academy of Sciences defines resilience as "the ability to plan and 
prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse events" (The National 
Academies, 2012). In response, resilient infrastructure systems have been 
extensively recognized as an alternative to traditional infrastructure in managing 
systems more reliable against unforeseen and unknown threats, i.e., “surprises” 
(Woods et al., 2012). 
Before ranking the statements for Question B, participants deliberated their decision 
contexts to guide their sorting on a specific infrastructure matter in the area either for an 
existing case or a hypothetical case. The decision context included a type of 
infrastructure, location within the metro-Phoenix area, and a type of weather events (e.g. 
a 100-year frequency rainfall). A general definition of safe-to-fail was given, while 
allowing practitioners to interpret the meaning of the term. 
Safe-to-fail infrastructure are built systems designed to lose function in controlled 
ways, even when design threshold is exceeded in unpredicted hazards. 
Question C considered failure consequences in the process of developing resilient 
infrastructure to the past flooding disaster in Houston experienced during Hurricane 
Harvey in 2017. To provide an explicit decision context for the third question, selected 
quotes used to describe the Houston case were provided: 
“But there is, and most Houstonians casually accept the enormous drainage 
system—the bayous, creeks and gullies—that keep it precariously dry in a former 
wetland.; The only solution is to widen the waterways, which means buying up 
adjacent buildings and tearing them down.; Brays Bayou, which has been 
widened in recent decades, surged over its banks in several spots, spilling feet of 
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water into adjacent neighborhoods.; The county engineer puts the price tag on a 
total upgrade at $26 billion, which will not happen soon. (Baddour, 2016)” 
5.2.2. Q-sample: Collecting statements 
 
The Q-sample in Q-methodology refers to the statements, objects, or other 
artifacts that study participants sort during each of the three sorting activities. The Q-
sample for this study is a collection of statements on describing various resilience 
strategies which reflect various adaptive capacities of infrastructure system to respond to 
climate risks in certain ways. As one of this study objectives is to investigate how the 
concept of resilience developed by researchers are understood and interpreted by 
practitioners, we developed a Q-sample of 19 resilience strategies developed and 
analyzed to understand researchers’ diverse viewpoints on developing resilient 
infrastructure found in Kim et al. (2017a). The 19 strategies make a comprehensive list 
encapsulating the discourse, or  “the flow of communicability surrounding any topic” (S. 
R. Brown, 1993), derived from 10 studies on resilience and safe-to-fail infrastructure. 
Initially, in Kim et al., a total of 43 strategies were collected, which were then coded into 
either fail-safe or safe-to-fail based on author’s perspective. By combining similar 
strategies that share similar definitions and descriptions among various authors, the initial 
list of collected statements were aggregated into 19 distinct strategies (See Table 5.1). 
We adopted these 19 strategies and their descriptions as statements consisting of the Q-
sample of this study. 
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Table 5.1. Q-sample: 19 Resilience strategies for infrastructure development 
# Strategy How achieved…? 
1 Adaptability/ 
Adaptive Capacity 
Increasing a system’s capacity to change in response to 
new pressures and to manage known and unknown events 
2 Adaptive Planning 
Design/Innovation 
Opening existing analysis, design, and implementation 
practices to encourage creativity with the goal of gaining 
knowledge for future solutions 
3 Anticipation Improving the capacity to foresee and predict positive and 
negative future system states 
4 Armoring By hardening or stiffening a system or component to 
exogenous shocks via the addition of new components or 
functions 
5 (Bio and Social) 
Diversity 
By using solutions with a greater number of forms, 
behaviors, and responses across a wider range of 
conditions 
6 Efficiency Designing for system performance with modest resource 
consumption 
7 Fail-Operation Enabling systems to continue to work despite failures and 
faults 
8 Fail-Silence Developing a negative feedback mechanism to achieve 
system self-shutdown in case of component or human 
failure 
9 Isolation Reducing connectivity, interdependence, functionality, and 
interactions among system components and between 
systems where those interactions already existed 
10 Learning/ 
Learning-by-doing 
Creating retrospective feedback loops between response 
actions to assess and develop new knowledge and adaptive 
strategies, 
11 Multi-functionality/ 
Flexibility 
Through the design of systems or components with 
extensible functionality, capacity for reconfiguration, 
intertwining/combined functions, and time-shifted 
functions 
12 Networks/ 
Connectivity/ 
Cohesion 
Creating linkages within systems that support and maintain 
functional connectivity 
13 Oversizing Increasing existing system and component tolerance, 
capacities, robustness, functionality 
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14 Redundancy/ 
Modularization 
When multiple elements or components provide the same, 
similar, or backup functions 
15 Renewability/ 
Regrowth 
Enabling the recovery of system or component function 
from endogenous and exogenous forces 
16 Sensing Improving the capacity by which new system stresses are 
efficiently and rapidly incorporated into current 
understanding 
17 Strengthening By hardening or stiffening a system or component to 
exogenous shocks via the upgrade of existing components 
or functions 
18 Transdisciplinarity Enabling dissimilar stakeholders to contribute to and 
benefit from a mutual experience 
19 Transformability 
 
Enabling the capacity to create an entirely new system 
when existing structures are untenable 
 
5.2.3. Q-sort: Ranking the statements 
 
In the Q-methodology, participants are asked to rank the Q-sample using the Q-
sort table (Figure 5.1) based on their experience and perspectives. For this study, 
participants were identified via a local practitioner network and infrastructure agency 
websites. All potential participants received an invitation email with the purpose of the 
study. We invited the participants whose responses indicated that their work was related 
to infrastructure preparedness and flooding. The final study set included total of 16 
participants from state, regional, and city governments. A set of study materials including 
paper copies of a Q-sort table (Figure 5.1), binning table, Q-sample (i.e., list of 19 
strategies with descriptions), and a stack of cards with printed statements was distributed 
to each participant. 
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Figure 5.1. The Q-sort table guides participants to rank 19 statements in a quasi-normal 
distribution reflecting their subjectivity on the topic 
 Study participants completed one Q-sort for each Question (A-C) in small groups 
and in three successive stages to observe the changes in perspectives in different decision 
contexts. A single question stage consisted of three phases: 1) The facilitator explains the 
background and rationale of the study question to the group of participants; 2) The 
participants respond to the question by sorting the selected statements with given values 
in a Q-sort table from +3 (most relevant) to -3 (least relevant); 3) A semi-structured 
interview of each participant and the group is conducted to identify their reasoning for the 
Q-sort product. A quasi-normal distribution table for ranking the Q-sort table was used 
rather than asking practitioners to rate the statements individually to represent their 
perspective, i.e., the number of columns on each side of the Q-sort table corresponded to 
the other, with an increased number of Q-sample responses remaining in the middle  (S. 
R. Brown, 1993). The Q-sort table is meant to capture the viewpoint on a certain 
resilience strategy that practitioners think about in relation to others, rather than in 
isolation. 16 participants produced 16 Q-sorts for each of Question A and B. 15 
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participants produced 15 Q-sorts for Question C. One participant had to leave one 
meeting early due to a schedule conflict. As a result, a total of 47 “Q-sorts” representing 
diverse perspectives on employing resilience for infrastructure development were 
collected. The examples of interview questions asked to participants after each stage are: 
 Why did you choose <this strategy of the 19 in the Q-sample> as the most/least 
relevant strategy? Do you have a real-world example demonstrating your 
reasoning? 
 Which of these resilience strategies are most difficult to categorize? Why? 
 Which of these resilience strategies are most useful to guide decisions for 
infrastructure development? Why? 
 Can you think of any other resilience strategies important for guiding 
infrastructure development not included here? 
 What criteria did you have in your head for sorting strategies? Is your decision 
criteria the same for all three questions? 
5.2.4. Factor analysis and constructing discourses 
 
The collected Q-sorts were analyzed using factor analysis, a statistical correlation 
method. The publicly available Q-methodology software PQMethod-2.35 was used for 
the factor analysis (Schmolck, 2014) on the sets of Q-sorts responding to each question. 
The following steps for factor analysis were repeated three times, once for each 
respective study question. The first step of factor analysis is to enter the Q-sorts into the 
program. Principal components analysis (PCA) was chosen for factor analysis as it is the 
most common and well-established method (Akhtar-Danesh, 2017). PCA correlates every 
participant’s Q-sort with every other Q-sort to test the correlation among collected data. 
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In this study each question has 16 variables (i.e., 16 Q-sorts produced by 16 participants; 
15 for Question C) and 19 observations (i.e., Q-sample statements). With PCA, the 
variance of Q-sorts were observed and extracted as clustered factors representing shared 
or discrete perspectives, thus allowing researchers to explore the range of viewpoints 
responding to each question. By default, in the PQMethod, a maximum of eight factors 
are extracted due to computational limitations. The first factor had the highest level of 
variance in the dataset, the second factor had the second highest variance, and the rest of 
six factors thereafter. The resulting cumulative explanatory variances were 90, 91, and 
91 % with eight extracted factors for each question of this study, respectively. This means 
that 90 ~ 91 % of 15~16 Q-sorts can be explained with the eight extracted factors. The 
next step in the standard study protocol of Q-methodology is to ‘rotate’ the extracted 
factors to simplify the representation of each factor’s statistical values, which helps the 
interpretation of each factors into discourses. Varimax rotation technique was used in this 
study to rotate the factors with Eigenvalues higher than one. This process maximizes the 
number of Q-sorts associated with only one factor (Cousins, 2017). In the next step, 
significant factors that can be considered as meaningful shared perspectives. The 
significance of factors was determined with the common Q-methodology criteria of i) the 
composite reliability is higher than 90 % and ii) the number of defining variables (Q-
sorts) are more than three (Akhtar-Danesh, 2017; Hagan & Williams, 2016; Watts & 
Stenner, 2005). The composite reliability is calculated by the expression Rxx = 0.80*p/[1 
+ (p - 1)*0.80], where p is the number of Q-sorts defining a factor (S. R. Brown, 1980). 
The result produced “idealized” sorts (factor arrays), which explained shared and/or 
distinct perspectives for each question – one “idealized” sorts for Question A; three 
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“idealized” sorts for Question B; two “idealized” sorts for Question C. The characteristics 
of “idealized” factors are summarized in Table 5.2, Table 5.3, and Table 5.4. The factor 
scores (i.e., Z-score, a weighted average of the values given to each statement by 
participants defining the factor (S. R. Brown, 1980; Ellingsen et al., 2010); range from -3 
to +3 in this study) are shown in Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3, and Figure 5.4. 
Table 5.2. The factor characteristics of each “idealized” factor for Question A 
Factor characteristics for 
Question A 
Factor 
A1 
Eigenvalue 4.8102 
Number of defining variables 5 
Composite reliability 0.952 
% explanatory variance 26 
 
Table 5.3. The factor characteristics of each “idealized” factor for Question B 
Factor characteristics for 
Question B 
Factor 
B1 B2 B3 
Eigenvalue 5.0659 2.7679 2.0350 
Number of defining variables 4 3 4 
Composite reliability 0.941 0.923 0.941 
% explanatory variance 22 15 19 
 
Table 5.4. The factor characteristics of each “idealized” factor for Question C 
Factor Characteristics for 
Question C 
Factor 
C1 C2 
Eigenvalue 4.8856 2.3745 
Number of defining variables 3 3 
Composite reliability 0.923 0.923 
% explanatory variance 26 13 
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Figure 5.2. Z-scores for “idealized” factors of Question A 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Z-scores for “idealized” factors of Question B 
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Figure 5.4. Z-scores for “idealized” factors of Question C 
 
The results of “idealized” Q-sorts from factor analysis were interpreted in 
combination with the interview data for the interpretative discourse construction, which 
helps understand the quantitative outcome of factor analysis. Interpretative discourse 
construction is to gain an in-depth understanding of the participants’ frame of reference 
and identify the reasoning behind their resulting Q-sorts as a narrative view rather than a 
view with representational statements and the rankings. Results of factor analysis 
provided information on participants that had a statistical significance in producing 
respective “idealized” Q-sorts. Thus, participants’ interview data were selected and 
interpreted based on their significance of support for each “idealized” Q-sort. Also, 
distinguishing and consensus statements among “idealized” Q-sorts for each question 
were reviewed to construct discourses representing shared or discrete perspectives among 
participants. A distinguishing statement has a Q-sort score (i.e., Z-score ranging from -3 
to +3) that is statistically unique for a specific factor, while a consensus statement does 
not notably distinguish in the Q-sort score between any pair of factors (S. R. Brown, 
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1993; Cousins, 2017). Constructing discourses based on identified factors were subjected 
to interpretative analysis using interview data, but focused on capturing respondent’s 
subjectivity with respect to factor analysis without inferring investigator’s subjectivity. 
5.3. Results 
 
 The identified Q-factors were used to construct discourses that illustrate the 
variety of practitioner perspectives on resilience strategies and safe-to-fail that are 
reflected in infrastructure development for climate change adaptation. Discourses 
constructed for each question with the “idealized” factors and the interview data provide 
vital information for understanding diverse practitioner viewpoints. Discourses further 
elucidate participants’ thoughts on selected statements associated issues with individual 
resilience strategies and the reasoning participants use for decisions to rank certain 
strategies in relation to others. 
 We define the single “idealized” factor for Question A as “The Realistic 
Resilience Discourse”. This discourse is a general perspective on resilience for 
infrastructure development. We define three “idealized” factors for Question B as “The 
Adaptive Infrastructure Discourse”, “The Transformative Infrastructure Discourse”, and 
“The Efficient Infrastructure Discourse”. These discourses apply resilience strategies for 
developing safe-to-fail infrastructure in the metro-Phoenix area. We define the two 
“idealized” factors for Question C as “The Soft Infrastructure Discourse” and “The Hard 
Infrastructure Discourse”. Each considers failure consequences in the process of 
developing resilient infrastructure. The different numbers of “idealized” factors for each 
study question confirm that different decision contexts affect the variation of viewpoints 
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in spite of applying the same Q-sample of resilience strategies. This shows the advantage 
of using the Q-methodology for exploring stakeholder’s diverse perspectives on applying 
resilience strategies to emphasize various adaptive capacities of infrastructure system. 
The benefit of Q-methodology for prioritization of infrastructure adaptive capacities is 
also demonstrated since various resilience strategies are considered constructively in 
relation to each other, rather than emphasize a particular resilience strategy. In 
comparison, traditional stakeholder study methods such as surveys only result in the 
popularity or importance on test variables (i.e., resilience strategies in this study) among 
the randomized large number of study participants. (Barry & Proops, 1999; Cuppen, 
Bosch-Rekveldt, Pikaar, & Mehos, 2016). In the following sections, the discourses are 
illustrated for each study question by interpreting both the Q-factor analysis and the 
discursive analysis of interview data. 
5.3.1. General perspective on resilience for infrastructure development 
 
Practitioners’ perspective on applying the concept of resilience for infrastructure 
development, in general, is driven by their institution’s current capabilities and needs in 
developing resilient systems. Among the 19 strategies, participants have a consensus on 
the statement of multi-scale networks/connectivity/cohesion as a moderate relevant 
strategy (#12, +1) to be considered across institutions and levels of government for 
encouraging collaboration to promote a coherent resilience strategy across interconnected 
systems. Creating linkages across systems to maintain functional connectivity as well as 
to support coordinated management and maintenance across the various levels of 
governing institution is observed to be relevant for promoting resilient infrastructure by 
practitioners. 
  102 
The Realistic Resilience Discourse 
This discourse is based on the perspective of promoting resilient system by 
pursuing new solutions for infrastructure design and management with a recognition that 
current systems may not be effective in responding to the changing environment with 
respect to urbanization, population increase, and climatic events. The “idealized” Q-sort 
is displayed in Figure 5.5. The Realistic Resilience Discourse embeds a strong concern 
that isolating the system (#9, -3) by “reducing connectivity, interdependence, 
functionality, and interactions among system components and between systems where 
those interactions already existed” is not pragmatic. As maintaining interdependency 
such as power-water and roadway-drainage dependencies is critical to provide reliable 
infrastructure services to the region, practitioners in this discourse affirm that isolating 
systems is not realistic. 
 
Figure 5.5. The “idealized” Q-sort for Factor A1: “The Realistic Resilience Discourse”. 
Strategy in red color presents the distinguishing statements for this factor, and strategy in 
blue color presents the consensus statements shared with other factors. 
Three statements appeal to distinguish this discourse from other perspectives, 
namely, “adaptive planning and design innovation” (#2, +3), “fail-operation” (#7, 0), and 
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“oversizing” (#13, -2).  This discourse highlights the need for institutions to allow 
adaptive planning and design to innovate existing analysis, design, and implementation 
practices with the goal of gaining knowledge for future solutions. Practitioners in this 
discourse acknowledge that being dependent on standard practices is less relevant to 
design and mange resilient infrastructure to changing climate. This discourse emphasizes 
that infrastructure resilience would derive from building upon past successes and failures 
to infuse new knowledge into the system and to be at the forefront of technology and 
innovation. It also acknowledges that financial constraints are one of the biggest 
considerations for implementing infrastructure projects, and cannot be ignored when 
increasing the resilience of an infrastructure system. Encouraging innovations in design is 
viewed particularly positively in this discourse, because changes in design and planning 
occur before institutions start investing money toward a project or physically altering the 
infrastructure in unaccustomed ways.  In the same regard, even though “oversizing” is a 
common strategy used to increase infrastructure capacity to deal with adverse impacts in 
traditional infrastructure development, it is considered a less economical solution with the 
recent changing risk profiles and uncertainty of future climate. Statements positioned 
along the neutral score such as “fail-operation”, “transdisciplinarity”, and “anticipation” 
are explained as strategies that practitioners have less technical or institutional capacity to 
implement, which also emphasizes the practicality of promoting resilience strategies for 
infrastructure system. 
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5.3.2. Application of resilience strategies for developing safe-to-fail infrastructure in the 
metro-Phoenix area 
“Idealized” factors for Question B produce three discourses driven by 
practitioners’ professional experience and their current role mitigating flooding risk with 
infrastructure development and management in the metro-Phoenix area. Among 19 
strategies, participants have a consensus across three “idealized” factors on statements 
like “renewability/regrowth” (#15, +1) and “redundancy/modularization” (#14, 0) as 
moderately relevant and neutral in developing safe-to-fail infrastructure for confronting 
flooding issues, respectively. This consensus is attributed to the common features of 
current flood management solutions in Phoenix. It also demonstrates a common 
understanding that a “safe-to-fail” approach underscores the safe performance of 
infrastructure by adding multiple components for backups to provide reliable services 
and/or enabling the effective recovery of infrastructure from a functional failure (Ahern, 
2011; Möller & Hansson, 2008). 
The Adaptive Infrastructure Discourse 
This discourse is based on developing safe-to-fail infrastructure for stormwater 
management by focusing on localized flooding in the metro-Phoenix area. The 
“idealized” Q-sort is displayed in Figure 5.6. This perspective aligns with the general 
perspective on resilience identified by “The Realistic Resilience Discourse” in Question 
A, but is more focused on seeking creative and unprecedented solutions for local flooding 
issues. Practitioners identified in this discourse suggest that creative solutions and 
knowledge is needed to prepare and design infrastructure for flooding caused by 
infrequent, but highly variable precipitation events in the area. As the impact of 
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infrastructure failures from localized flood does not often cause fatal damages, 
practitioners tend to put importance on experimental strategies like “(bio and social) 
diversity” (#5, +2) and “multi-functionality/flexibility” (#11, +1), that may not work and 
require testing. Also, these strategies enable the system to adapt when flooding risk 
thresholds are compromised. Multiple respondents to this discourse describe their 
rationale for sorting strategies as associating safe-to-fail with characteristics of green 
infrastructure or best practices that provide solutions to localized flooding. This discourse 
also emphasizes the need of planning the repair and maintenance across a system’s entire 
life span to support the infrastructure to be safe-to-fail. 
 
Figure 5.6. The “idealized” Q-sort for Factor B1: “The Adaptive Infrastructure 
Discourse”. Strategy in red color presents the distinguishing statements for this factor, 
and strategy in blue color presents the consensus statements shared with other factors. 
The adaptive infrastructure discourse finds “armoring” (#4, -2) and “isolation” 
(#9, -3) as unattractive and unfeasible to fund for stromwater management. Also, since 
stormwater systems are usually set up in accordance with other primary infrastructure 
(e.g., roads), it is not plausible to reduce system connectivity or add new components and 
functions to the existing systems. Similarly, “multi-scale networks/connectivity/ 
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cohesion” (#12, +2) is relevant in this discourse because connectivity is not only required 
by physical structures, but also among the various levels of infrastructure managing 
institutions. 
The Transformative Infrastructure Discourse 
This discourse is based on developing safe-to-fail infrastructure with respect to 
large-scale flooding events and the rapid growth of population and cities in the metro-
Phoenix area. The “idealized” Q-sort is displayed in Figure 5.7. Considering population 
growth in the metro-Phoenix area, participants stressed the need for 
“transformability/transformation” (#19, +3) strategies to develop safe-to-fail 
infrastructure against heavy precipitation (e.g., 100-year return period). It emphasizes a 
need to create an entirely new infrastructure system when existing structures are 
untenable, such as relocating residential areas away from the current flood hazard zone. 
The “fail-operation” (#7, +2) and “fail-Silence” (#8, +1) strategies are also emphasized as 
infrastructure systems managing large-scale floods should be designed for minimizing the 
impact of failures and associated damages.
 
  107 
Figure 5.7. The “idealized” Q-sort for Factor B2: “The Transformative Infrastructure 
Discourse”. Strategy in red color presents the distinguishing statements for this factor, 
and strategy in blue color presents the consensus statements shared with other factors. 
In this discourse, the strategy of “oversizing” (#13, 0) receives neutral relevance 
for safe-to-fail, because it is an unavoidable strategy to deal with the large risks expected 
with climate projections. This is true even as participants recognized that oversizing 
and/or strengthening the infrastructure system has minimal capability to control the 
failure consequences when risk thresholds are exceeded. Interestingly, this discourse is 
distinct as “multi-scale networks/connectivity/cohesion” (#12, -1) is treated as less 
relevant for developing safe-to-fail infrastructure in the metro-Phoenix area when 
compared to other “idealized” factors. This is because large-scale flood infrastructure 
such as flood storage and open channel conveyance are often built and managed by the a 
single responsible institution and are managed under strict regulations. Thus, participants 
argued this makes it difficult to create or harness linkages between systems and 
managerial institutions. 
The Efficient Infrastructure Discourse 
This discourse is focuses on developing safe-to-fail infrastructure in with respect 
to region-wide flooding problems and current financial constraints. The “idealized” Q-
sort is displayed in Figure 5.8. Viewpoints on safe-to-fail infrastructure in this discourse 
emphasize pragmatic solutions to mitigate flooding risks when, in the Phoenix-metro 
area, there is little or no attention paid to flood management. These practitioners state that 
there is currently a limited funding to deal with flooding issues, especially since the semi-
arid region of Phoenix that experiences only infrequent flash floods. However, 
precipitation patterns are becoming unpredictable, making flood control a more 
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complicated issue than in the past. Utilizing “multi-functionality/flexibility” (#11, +2) 
strategy that adopts “the design of systems or components with extensible functionality, 
capacity for reconfiguration, intertwining/combined functions, and time-shifted 
functions” is highly valued to prepare for unpredictable, infrequent flooding with limited 
budget. For example, creating green areas in existing vacant lots can promote multi-
functionality, but creating a place for recreation and social cohesion during dry seasons 
while acting as a bioretention basin to accommodate rainfall during wet season. Notably, 
“fail-silence” (#8, +3) is emphasized in this discourse by highlighting the need to shut 
down infrastructure systems when multi-functional solutions do not work and avoid more 
intricate and problematic damages across various system functions. 
 
Figure 5.8. The “idealized” Q-sort for Factor B2: “The Efficient Infrastructure 
Discourse”. Strategy in red color presents the distinguishing statements for this factor, 
and strategy in blue color presents the consensus statements shared with other factors. 
Since funding constraints are the highest concern of this discourse, “armoring” 
(#4, -3) and “oversizing” (#13, -2) are perceived as the least relevant strategies for safe-
to-fail infrastructure development. Multiple respondents portray these strategies as 
expensive solutions for the limited improvement they offer for mitigating failure. 
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5.3.3. Considering failure consequences in the process of developing resilient 
infrastructure 
Results of the factor analysis for Question C construct two discourses based on 
“idealized” factors. These discourses are driven by a participant’s standpoint on failure 
consequences and emphasize either soft or hard infrastructure solutions. Soft 
infrastructure encompasses knowledge systems, humans, institutions, and policies such as 
communication among institutions, rules and regulations governing the various 
infrastructure system, design specification, the financing of systems, and professionals 
managing infrastructure. Hard infrastructure refers to physical systems that are built and 
engineered. In the case of Hurricane Harvey in Houston, Texas used to form Question C, 
the failure of infrastructure systems and resulting consequences exemplify problems that 
can be solved both by soft and hard infrastructure. These include insufficient information 
on climatic conditions that exacerbate the damage caused by heavy rainfall, infrastructure 
systems built without considering pre-existing topographical characteristics of city, path-
dependent infrastructure management practices, malfunctioning infrastructure, and a lack 
of funding for upgrading the infrastructure systems, among others.  
There is consensus across the two discourses on strategies like 
“renewability/regrowth” (#15, 0), “redundancy/modularization” (#14, 0), “anticipation” 
(#3, 0), “multi-functionality/flexibility” (#11, +1), and “isolation” (#9, -2). This is 
attributed to the broad applicability of these strategies in both in soft and hard 
infrastructure solutions for #3, #11, #14, and #15. Strategy #9 is perceived as a less 
promising strategy for the Houston case, as isolated bayous were identified by 
participants as ineffective for isolating flood retention basins from residential areas. 
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The Soft Infrastructure Discourse 
This discourse focuses on addressing failure consequences by enhancing soft 
infrastructure solutions in the infrastructure development process. The “idealized” Q-sort 
is displayed in Figure 5.9. These participants emphasize that the major problem in 
Harvey appeared to be a lack of planning and a poor understanding of what the actual 
flooding risks were. In Houston, the actual risks were damages experienced by overflow 
from the bayous and waterways in nearby neighborhoods. While the same physical 
infrastructure such as bayous and waterways were constructed and widened as the flood 
hazard zone expanded, when the capacity of these structures was exceeded during 
Hurricane Harvey, nearby neighborhoods were flooded. This discourse recognizes a 
stagnant flood mitigation strategy focused on built systems was ineffective for 
minimizing consequences, and suggests resilience requires practitioners to come up with 
new solutions by promoting “adaptive planning and design innovation” (#2, +3). This is 
primarily achieved with soft infrastructure solutions that create greater recognition of 
flooding risks with sufficient climate data and past experiences, e.g., by working with 
community members to inform about risks of living in flood hazard zones or by 
allocating funds in various attributes of infrastructure. 
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Figure 5.9. The “idealized” Q-sort for Factor C1: “The Soft Infrastructure Discourse”. 
Strategy in red color presents the distinguishing statements for this factor, and strategy in 
blue color presents the consensus statements shared with other factors. 
This discourse considers “transformability/transformation” (#19, -1) as 
particularly less relevant for dealing with failure consequences, since changes in 
knowledge systems institutions, regulations, and policy usually take a longer time to be 
implemented to lead to changes in physical systems. 
The Hard Infrastructure Discourse 
This discourse focuses on addressing failure consequences by remedying past 
failures and improving existing hard infrastructure solutions during the infrastructure 
development processes. The “idealized” Q-sort is displayed in Figure 5.10. Respondents 
in this discourse focus on how to better design and manage physical infrastructure 
systems to avoid the catastrophic failure of system. Participants in this group highlight 
“fail-operation” (#7, +3) and “fail-silence” (#8, +2) as the most relevant strategies in 
developing hard infrastructure system that would not forfeit nearby neighborhoods nor 
other connected infrastructure systems by shutting down physical systems and 
maintaining their critical function despite component failures.  
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Figure 5.10. The “idealized” Q-sort for Factor C2: “The Hard Infrastructure 
Discourse”. Strategy in red color presents the distinguishing statements for this factor, 
and strategy in blue color presents the consensus statements shared with other factors. 
 Notably, this discourse considers on “multi-scale 
networks/connectivity/cohesion” (#12, -3) and “sensing” (#16, -2) as less relevant than 
other factors. Creating more connected and interdependent system would inherently make 
the management of a system more difficult, especially in situations that requires shutting 
down failing systems. Also, hard infrastructure is often built in accordance with design 
specification and regulations to last for a long time with less flexibility, thus improving 
the capacity to sense new stresses and incorporate new risk information in infrastructure 
design decisions is challenging. 
5.4. Conclusion 
 By engaging with practitioners at state, regional, and municipal governments, this 
study demonstrates how practitioners view resilience and its associated strategies as 
important means to develop safe-to-fail infrastructure and tackle climate risks. More 
importantly by using the Q-methodology, we can understand how they arrive at their 
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conclusions. A certain definition of resilience does not neatly describe the importance or 
relevance of practical regimes nor there is a standalone perspective that fits in all 
contexts. From the diverse perspectives on resilience observed in this study, practitioners’ 
interpretation of resilience adds value to the literature for understanding why different 
resilience strategies may be preferred in different decision contexts. Practitioner 
perspectives further reveal that decision considerations such as intensity of the event, 
identified system vulnerability, and the extent of institutional, social, physical and 
financial capacity to withstand infrastructure failure all affect infrastructure development 
and management decisions. They put different importance on various resilience 
strategies, even when considering the same city for the same weather risk (i.e., flooding). 
 This study also confirms several benefits of using Q-methodology to engage with 
stakeholders for developing safe-to-fail infrastructure. Firstly, there are a limited number 
of practitioners at city, regional, and state governments who directly influence decisions 
for infrastructure development. Where R-methodology (e.g., surveys and questionnaires) 
usually requires a large sample size to make statistically meaningful results, Q-
methodology only requires few respondents who are of most associated to the topic. 
Also, Q-methodology shows the variety of perspectives among participants through the 
valuation of all statements presented, rather than focusing on few, isolated statements in 
R-methodology. This facilitates incorporating multiple resilience strategies in 
infrastructure development by observing valuable expert knowledge held in few, critical 
perspectives, instead of identifying popular resilience strategies among many 
respondents. Secondly, Q-methodology can support safe-to-fail infrastructure 
development where a diversity of infrastructure failure consequences must be prioritized 
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by decision-makers. Q-methodology is designed in a way that respondents must evaluate 
all the given statements in relation to each other and force making trade-offs in 
prioritizing one statement over the other. While this study uses Q-methodology to 
prioritize resilience strategies, it can also be used to prioritize various types of failure 
consequences and costs in development. This may reveal how stakeholders consider both 
tangible and intangible costs experienced when infrastructure fails, and provide a means 
to achieve safe-to-fail development.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation contributes to identifying ways to overcome significant 
limitations in current infrastructure development practices for establishing a decision 
context; identifying, analyzing, and evaluating risks; choosing a risk management 
solution; and guiding a system design that acknowledges infrastructure failure caused by 
non-stationary climate risks. In current infrastructure development, there is no working 
definition of safe-to-fail that guides decision-makers to establish a decision context for 
risk management considering both climate hazards and infrastructure failure 
consequences. Risks are only evaluated with frequency and intensity of a weather event 
itself, without considering possible failure consequences that can be experienced in 
various forms. Also, infrastructure hazards and risks are often identified early in the 
development process based on historical observations to make the most accurate 
estimation of necessary risk threshold for creating fail-safe infrastructure systems. The 
adaptive capacity of infrastructure systems to mitigate risks is often ignored when 
choosing infrastructure solutions, since current development decisions only focus on 
choosing systems that reliably operate within a calculated risk threshold. Once the type of 
infrastructure solution is chosen, the system is designed to satisfy design codes and 
regulations and to persist for a long time. However, infrastructure risk models, solutions, 
design codes, and regulations rarely update and often do not reflect the rich knowledge of 
diverse and regional infrastructure experts, including engineers, planners, policymakers, 
and climate risk scientists. Incorporating a diversity of expert knowledge in infrastructure 
development may provide new and useful information about how different adaptive 
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capacities of infrastructure need be emphasized in tackling risks to complement existing 
infrastructure systems, responsible institutions, vulnerable populations, and funding 
availability among other considerations. 
 This dissertation addresses these limitations by promoting safe-to-fail 
infrastructure development. Chapter 2 provides a new definition of safe-to-fail and 
demonstrates what decisions are needed and how to address the infrastructure failure in 
identifying and analyzing risk. It further reveals the decision dilemma of the 
“infrastructure trolley problem” that requires decisions made by prioritizing the various 
failure costs infrastructure systems may experience and/or cause. Chapter 3 presents a 
method to evaluate the risk of infrastructure failure with consideration of climate change 
impacts, which helps the prioritization of future failure costs. Chapter 4 identifies 
resilience strategies that characterize and compare the adaptive capacity of diverse 
infrastructure solutions and applies multi-criteria decision analysis to prioritize 
infrastructure solutions for managing roadway flooding in Phoenix, Arizona. Chapter 5 
proposes to engage with regional practitioners to identify how they interpret resilience 
strategies and apply them in safe-to-fail infrastructure development based on their 
professional experience. It further identifies how a practitioners’ perspective of safe-to-
fail varies when reflecting upon current capacity of their expert region to adapt to non-
stationary climate and associated risks. Practitioner perspectives are distinguished from 
and more nuanced than dominant safe-to-fail perspectives proposed in research literature. 
The findings of each chapter articulate additional decision considerations, tools, and 
strategies for safe-to-fail infrastructure development in the following ways: 
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Figure 6.1. Novel safe-to-fail infrastructure development with the highlighted key 
contributions of this dissertation 
 Summary of Chapter 2: Safe-to-fail infrastructure development requires a broader 
scope of knowledge to address the decision dilemma called the infrastructure 
trolley problem than current fail-safe practice. The development process needs to 
consider context specific information including existing infrastructure services, 
social vulnerability, different types of failure cost, and institutional adaptation 
capacities among others. One approach to address the decision dilemma in safe-
to-fail infrastructure development is to engage multiple stakeholders, including 
decision makers and community members to determine the prioritization for the 
acceptable consequences of infrastructure failure and their associated costs. 
 Summary of Chapter 3: The consequences of infrastructure failure are 
demonstrated by evaluating the impact of storm drainage failure on 
interconnected roadway systems. Infrastructure vulnerability assessment provides 
useful information to identify and estimate infrastructure failure consequences 
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when both infrastructure system services (e.g., mobility for roads) and the 
intensity of extreme weather events are considered together. Furthermore, 
assessment of infrastructure failure impacts provides useful information for 
prioritizing various failure costs. 
 Summary of Chapter 4: Safe-to-fail adaptation offers one approach to develop 
infrastructure systems based on their adaptive capacity, by focusing attention on 
specific resilience strategies for managing the consequences of infrastructure 
failure. Diverse perspectives on safe-to-fail lead to discrete infrastructure solution 
recommendations. Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) is an effective way to 
guide safe-to-fail infrastructure development decisions by systematically 
organizing decision criteria and providing a means to combine disparate 
information, including resilience strategies, infrastructure vulnerability 
assessments, and decision-maker preference on different safe-to-fail approaches.  
 Summary of Chapter 5: Current definitions of resilience and safe-to-fail do not 
neatly conform to regional needs for practical implementation in infrastructure 
development. Instead, incorporating stakeholders’ knowledge in determining what 
constitutes safe-to-fail infrastructure is critical in evaluating a region’s capacity to 
endure infrastructure failure consequences. Practitioner perspectives reflect the 
extent of institutional, social, physical, and financial capacities within a region 
and highlight nuanced resilience and safe-to-fail strategies for managing 
infrastructure failure not considered in the literature. This contributes to broad 
understanding of how practitioners apply the theoretical concept of resilience in 
climate change adaptation practices.  
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 This dissertation introduces new decision-making issues that change infrastructure 
development practices and suggest limitations to the implementation of safe-to-fail 
theory. Safe-to-fail infrastructure systems are now defined as those designed to lose 
function in controlled ways, such that infrastructure failure consequences are experienced 
based on prioritized decisions even when risk thresholds are exceeded in unpredictable 
hazards. New definition of safe-to-fail brings with it decision dilemmas associated, 
infrastructure vulnerabilities, resilience strategies, and multi-stakeholder engagement 
needs. Several questions for constructing and operating safe-to-fail infrastructure still 
need to be answered with future studies, including (but not limited to): 1) who is 
responsible for the decisions made for prioritizing failure consequences?; 2) who needs to 
be included in stakeholder engagement for prioritizing failure consequences and 
determine the appropriate extent of stakeholders in addressing the infrastructure trolley 
problem?; and 3) what regulations are needed to implement safe-to-fail infrastructure 
approach in practice and how will the role of institutions change to adapt to the new 
infrastructure development practice?  
 Who is responsible for the decisions made for prioritizing failure consequences? 
With the necessity for considering failure consequences in safe-to-fail infrastructure 
development, practitioners will need to make decisions that determine whom, where, and 
why people and infrastructure systems experience certain failure outcomes. Current 
infrastructure development decisions are made to protect a city against predicted climate 
risks, rather than to experience the outcomes of failures. In a sense, these decisions allow 
decision-makers and practitioners to transfer the responsibility of failing infrastructure 
systems to those that own, operate, or use them. Safe-to-fail infrastructure development, 
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instead, limits this transfer of risk, raising questions regarding to what extent practitioners 
should bear the infrastructure failure consequences. The amount responsibility that 
practitioners and decision-makers have for infrastructure failure outcomes is unclear. Do 
decision-makers take full responsibility or the stakeholders also take the responsibility for 
infrastructure failures if they were informed during development and knew of possible 
consequences? An example from the Mississippi river floods in 2011 shows that this 
transfer of risk attributes to longer decision-maker involvement and legal issues post-
infrastructure failure. 
Heavy rainfall in 2011 jeopardized thousands of homes in the populated area of 
Cairo, Illinois and with the risk of flooding. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) was granted a permission from the U.S. Supreme Court to blow up a part of 
levee and direct flood water into New Madrid Flood Plain (USACE, 2011). This decision 
made by USACE saved the city of Cairo and nearby areas from catastrophic flood 
damages, but it damaged farmlands located within the flood plain. Even though this 
decision is considered “safe-to-fail” operation of the levee system by prioritizing the 
human and property loss in a populated area over the economic loss of the flooded 
farmland, USACE was subjected in legal charges by farmers with the claim that the 
decision of levee breach violated the farmers' rights by taking their land without adequate 
compensation. This example demonstrates that safe-to-fail infrastructure decisions will 
challenge decision-makers and practitioners to have the extended responsibility for 
managing infrastructure failure consequences. 
 Who needs to be included in stakeholder engagement for prioritizing failure 
consequences and determine the appropriate extent of stakeholders in addressing the 
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infrastructure trolley problem? The work of this dissertation emphasizes the importance 
of engaging with multiple levels of stakeholders for making safe-to-fail infrastructure 
decisions. While tangible costs of infrastructure failure like property loss can be easily 
assumed in absolute economic terms, additional cost categories considered in safe-to-fail 
infrastructure development are not easily captured without the inclusion of broad 
stakeholder opinion. Infrastructure failure consequences such as people displaced, 
homelessness, livelihood damaged, increased unemployment, environmental losses, and 
health impacts may be experienced in relative ways depending on the affected 
stakeholders’ different capacity to respond and adjust to each adverse impact. Thus, 
another challenge for addressing the infrastructure trolley problem is social equity in risk 
mitigation. People affected by development decisions must be represented and informed 
in the decision-making process to prioritize “safe” infrastructure failure consequences. 
The extent of stakeholder engagement dictates the extent that infrastructure failures are 
understood and planned for. For example, if stakeholder engagement is not effective at 
including vulnerable populations who have a lower capacity to respond to health issues or 
unemployment caused by infrastructure failures, then cost prioritization decisions may 
make the same people more vulnerable to planned failures. In contrast, complete 
stakeholder engagement is untenable in most cities with large, diverse populations. Thus, 
an exhaustive study of how to engage and involve various stakeholders in safe-to-fail 
infrastructure development is necessary to address the infrastructure trolley problem. 
 What regulations are needed to implement safe-to-fail infrastructure approach in 
practice and how will the role of institutions change to adapt to the new infrastructure 
development practice? Regulations that govern infrastructure systems may need to 
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change to reflect this new safe-to-fail design and development. Whereas current 
infrastructure regulations focus on system construction and maintenance, safe-to-fail 
regulations may also require additional rules for sharing generally proprietary 
information with broader stakeholders. For example, safe-to-fail development may 
require sharing of data on infrastructure performance, decision criteria for prioritizing the 
failure costs, protocols for emergency system operation, and compensation of failure 
consequences. Furthermore, these changes in regulation will require changes in the role 
of institutions like governmental organizations, utilities, and insurance companies 
perform in infrastructure development, operation, and regulation. For example, one 
regulatory shift that promotes safe-to-fail development is for city governments to require 
insurance companies to provide accumulated information on infrastructure risks and 
damages experienced in the region. This information can be shared with the city 
government and the affected stakeholders to assess the current adaptive capacity based on 
the empirical data. 
 Each of these questions represent limitations in the current work that must be 
overcome with future evidence-based case studies to advance safe-to-fail infrastructure 
development. Real-world case studies are particularly valuable for identifying the transfer 
of risk, the extent of stakeholder engagement, and the changes to existing institutions 
necessary to promote a safe-to-fail approach. Moreover, future case studies offer a way to 
compare and categorize the regional, institutional, social, infrastructural, ecological 
capacity achieved by resilience strategies identified in this dissertation and relate them to 
various types of consequences experienced by infrastructure failure. Linking this 
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prospective approach with current retrospective practices may offer a systematic and 
comprehensive decision protocol for fail-safe and safe-to-fail infrastructure development. 
 In conclusion, this dissertation represents important first steps towards safe-to-fail 
infrastructure development. The literature now has an operational definition of safe-to-
fail infrastructure that acknowledges infrastructure failures in the development process 
and requires prioritization of infrastructure failure consequences. This urges decision-
makers to address infrastructure trolley problem of whom is affected by failure 
consequences and explicitly embed their resilience concepts and strategies in decision-
making process with their context-specific knowledge. Thus, multi-stakeholder 
engagement is a key element to encourage stakeholders to identify regional, institutional, 
financial, physical, and social capacity to withstand infrastructure failure. Future work 
should identify to what extent decision-makers bear infrastructure failure risks, 
stakeholders should be engaged, and regulations and institutions must change to 
accommodate this new theory and perspective. 
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